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The Battle over Medical Device Regulation:
Do the Federal Medical Device Amendments
Preempt State Tort Law Claims?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1988, Eunice Beavers died on an operating room table during an
angioplasty procedure.' A heart catheter, intended to enhance Mrs.
Beavers's health and prolong her life, malfunctioned by failing to de-
flate after being inserted in one of her coronary arteries. Mrs.
Beavers's heirs sued the manufacturer of the catheter, C.R. Bard, Inc.
("Bard"), for wrongful death, alleging several separate state tort
claims.3 In Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,4 however, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals recently ruled that the federal Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 ("Medical Device Amendments" or"MDA") 5
preempted all state tort claims, and therefore dismissed the Talbott
complaint.6
The MDA, which amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDCA"), requires the Food and Drug Administration to regulate and
approve all medical devices before they enter the market.7 For compli-
cated devices, such as heart catheters, manufacturers must conduct
extensive tests to prove that their devices are safe and effective,8 or
1. Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37, 39 (D. Mass. 1994) [hereinafter
Talbott 1], aff'd, 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593
(U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321). An angioplasty procedure is a "technique for treat-
ing stenosis (narrowing) or occlusion (blockage) of a blood vessel or heart valve by in-
troducing a balloon into the constricted area to widen it." THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 110 (Charles B. Clayman ed., 1st ed. 1989).
2. Talbott 1, 865 F. Supp. at 39, 41.
3. Id. at 39. The plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint charged the defendants with
20 counts, including claims of negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation and conceal-
ment, breach of express and implied warranties, negligence in hiring and training, bat-
tery, conspiracy, unfair trade practices, and negligent infliction of emotional distress.
Id. at 42. The plaintiffs sought both punitive and compensatory damages. Id.
4. 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Talbott I], petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb. 16, 1996) (No. 95-1321).
5. See infra note 87 and accompanying text for the general preemption rule of the
MDA, § 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) (1994).
6. Talbott i, 63 F.3d at 31.
7. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (1994). See infra part II.B.
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e (1994). See infra notes 77-86 and accompany-
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show that similar devices were distributed commercially before 1976. 9
The statute also provides for criminal penalties to be imposed upon
manufacturers who fail to comply with any aspect of the FDCA, in-
cluding the MDA.' °
In 1994, before Talbott was decided, Bard pled guilty to committing
391 criminal violations, all relating to its manufacture of the same type
of catheter that allegedly caused Mrs. Beavers's death." In United
States v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,' 2 a federal district court imposed criminal
and civil fines totalling sixty-one million dollars on Bard. 13 While the
Bard court recognized that there were "real human victims" as a result
of Bard's behavior, including Mrs. Beavers and her family, 14 it em-
phasized that the criminal sentence it imposed could not adequately
compensate these victims, and that civil suits would provide a more
complete remedy. 5 Nonetheless, in Talbott, the First Circuit inter-
preted the MDA as preventing the plaintiffs from obtaining a state rem-
edy from Bard.' 6
In contrast to the First Circuit's blanket preemption of state tort
claims in Talbott, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Kennedy
ing text (explaining the safety and effectiveness tests used for complicated medical de-
vices).
9. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994).
10. United States v. C.R. Bard; Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287, 288 (D. Mass. 1994)
(convicting Bard of 363 counts of violating MDA rules on shipping devices and obtain-
ing FDA approval for such shipment).
11. Id. at 288 & n.2. See also infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (outlining
plea agreement).
1 2. 848 F. Supp. 287 (D. Mass. 1994).
13. Id. at 294.
14. Id. at 292. During Bard's sentencing hearing, Mrs. Beavers's oldest daughter pre-
sented a tribute to her mother and also explained how her family, and especially her
mother, had been victimized by Bard's intentional criminal conduct. Sentencing
Hearing Transcript at 39, C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 287 (No. 93-10279-WF). The
daughter, Linda Talbott, addressed the Bard representatives and asked how they would
have felt if it "had been [their] mother or (their] grandmother and [they] had put [their]
trust and faith in medical devices?" Id. at 12. Ms. Talbott explained that her mother had
"trusted the company that made the medical device that would be used in her," and re-
membered how they had been told that success rates for the procedure were very high. Id.
at 11.
As Ms. Beavers's daughter reiterated, her family felt it was important to inform the
American public that Bard had victimized her family, and especially her mother. Id. at 9-
10. Ms. Beavers's family attended the sentencing hearing in the hopes that "somehow,
some way [something like] this (would] never happen again to unsuspecting families."
Id. at 12-13.
15. C.R. Bard, Inc,, 848 F. Supp. at 292-93.
16. Talbott II, 63 F.3d at 25 (holding all of the plaintiffs' claims preempted by §
360k(a) of the MDA).
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v. Collagen Corp., 7 that the MDA did not preempt state common law
actions.' 8 In Kennedy, a woman and her husband sued the manufac-
turer of a collagen implant under six different common law tort
claims' 9 after the woman developed a potentially fatal disease resulting
from her use of the collagen treatments.20 The Ninth Circuit inter-
preted Congress' intent under the Medical Device Amendments to al-
low plaintiffs to pursue a common law remedy for their injuries.2'
The Eleventh Circuit provided a third interpretation of preemption
under the MDA In Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,23 the court held that the
MDA preempted some common law claims, but failed to preempt oth-
ers.24 To reach this conclusion, the court relied heavily on FDA regu-
lations, which interpreted the MDA preemption provision as preempt-
ing only a narrow class of state claims.25
These three cases exemplify the sharp division among the federal
circuits on the extent to which the MDA preempts state tort claims.26
The resolution of this split remains critical to American consumers in-
jured by medical devices, because consumers will continue to be
treated differently in various jurisdictions-with some plaintiffs receiv-
ing compensation, and others receiving none-until a consistent inter-
pretation of the MDA is established. In January 1996, the Supreme
Court agreed to resolve the circuit split when it granted certiorari in the
Lohr case.27
17. 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995). See infra part III.C for a complete discussion of
Kennedy.
18. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459. State common law actions include tort claims. Id. at
1462 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 1454. The Kennedys alleged claims of "negligence, strict liability, breach
of warranty, battery, conspiracy, and loss of consortium." Id.
20. Id. See infra note 185 (describing the disease).
21. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1458-60.
22. See infra part III.B.
23. 56 F.3d 1335 (1lth Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 16 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
24. Id. at 1352. In doing so, the court recognized that its decision to "preempt some,
but not all" of the plaintiff's claims would not please either party. Id. Acknowledging
that it had carried out Congress' intent to the best of its ability by taking the middle
course, however, the court directed any dissatisfaction with its conclusion toward
Congress. Id. (citing American Airlines, v. Wolens, 115 S. Ct. 817, 827 (1995)). The
Ninth Circuit noted that decision-making, was not always clear-cut, and that "principles
seldom can be settled 'on the basis of one or two cases."' Id. (citations omitted). See
infra part III.B.
25. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1339-40. See infra part III.B.
26. Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State Products Liability Doctrines, 44
S.C. L. REV. 187, 190 (1993) (recognizing that federal courts "remain hopelessly di-
vided" on the issue of whether state tort law claims against manufacturers should be pre-
empted). See infra part Il1.
27. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1335.
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This Comment first examines the federal preemption doctrine, es-
tablished by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.28
Next, this Comment provides an overview of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976, discussing the scope of the preemption provi-
sions and explaining the FDA regulations interpreting these provi-
sions.29 This Comment then reviews a recent Supreme Court decision
addressing the issue of federal preemption of state tort claims.30
In light of this Supreme Court ruling, this Comment discusses re-
cent decisions determining whether the MDA preempts common law
tort actions and the resulting division among federal circuit courts.3 '
Next, this Comment analyzes the statute, legislative history, regula-
tions, and leading case law addressing the MDA and determines that
Congress did not intend to preempt state tort claims.32 This Comment
then proposes the steps that must be taken to ensure that injured con-
sumers can obtain adequate remedies for their injuries.33 Finally, this
Comment concludes that Congress enacted the MDA to realize its pri-
mary objective of protecting public health and safety, and thus recog-
nized that injured plaintiffs could still seek state common law reme-
dies.34
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Federal Preemption
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution established
the doctrine of federal preemption of state law.35 Proposing a balance
28. See ibtfra part II.A.
29. See infra part Il.B.
30. See infra part II.C.
3 1. See infra part Ill.
32. See infra part IV.
33. See infra part V.
34. See infra part VI.
35. Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D. Ind. 1994). See U.S.
CONST. art. VI1 cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
Id. One commentator suggests that the doctrine of preemption existed, in James
Madison's view, to serve "the real welfare of the great body of the people," and not to
safeguard any governmental institutions. Bianca I. Truitt, Injured Consumers and the
FDA: Should Federal Preemption Protect Medical Device Manufacturers Under a Quasi-
Governmental Immunity?, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 155, 169 (1994) (quoting Michael R. Tay-
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of power between federal and state governments, the Supremacy
Clause explicitly grants priority to federal law when the state law inter-
feres with, or is contrary to, federal law. 6 Federal law does not,
however, prevail over state law in every instance. 7
In determining whether a federal law preempts a state law,38 courts
examine the wording Congress employed in the federal law in an at-
tempt to determine congressional intent.3 9 The Supreme Court has
admonished that courts must assume that a federal act does not super-
sede a state's historic police powers unless it is the "clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.,, 40  As a result, courts have recognized that
]or, Federal Preemption and Food and Drug Regulation: The Practical, Modern Meaning
of an Ancient Doctrine, 38 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 306, 313 (1983)). Truitt proposes
that Madison's "theory indicates that when the 'great body of people' have spoken
through the federal legislature," state regulations must concede. Id. (quoting Taylor, at
310). Truitt suggests this theory explains "how and why" courts view federal preemp-
tion. Id.
36. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)
(recognizing that a federal-state balance exists unless Congress clearly conveys its in-
tent to preempt). The Supreme Court first recognized this principle in 1819 in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 427 (1819). Since that time, "it has been settled"
that the doctrine of preemption constitutes the resolution between federal and state law,
and all "state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect."' Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v. Louisiana, 451
U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
37. Angela W. Kronenberg, King v. Collagen Corporation: FDA Approval Insulates
Medical Device Manufacturers from State Common Law Liability, I I J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 563, 570 (1995) (noting that "not every federal law preempts state
law"). See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985) (stating that merely because "every subject that merits congressional legislation
is . . .a subject of national concern," does not suggest "that every federal statute ousts
all related state law").
38. Federal laws with preemptive force include the United States Constitution,
treaties, statutes, and federal regulations derived from "federal agencies acting within the
scope of their congressionally delegated authority." Kronenberg, supra note 37, at 570
(citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, rev'd sub nom. Rice v.
Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947))). State laws include state constitutions, statutes,
regulations, and state common law tort actions. Truitt, supra note 35, at 161. Truitt
stresses that although broad definitions of federal and state law exist, federal preemption
generally will "not be lightly imposed upon the states." Id.
39. Indeed, the intent of Congress governs when determining whether a federal statute
preempts a state law. See, e.g., Hawaiian Airlines, v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2243
(1994) (stating that whether a federal statute preempts state law is a question of
congressional intent); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (same);
Cable Television Ass'n v. Finneran, 954 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[iln
determining whether a federal law preempts a state regulation, 'lthe court's] task is to as-
certain Congress' intent in enacting the federal statute at issue."' (quoting Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983))).
40. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at
230). The Supreme Court furthered this idea by stating that the purpose of Congress is
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Congress' intent to preempt state law may be express or implied in the
federal statute.4'
Express preemption occurs when Congress explicitly states in the
statute its intention to displace state law. 2 In this situation, the
statute's express language completely governs its preemptive scope.43
Thus, all state laws that reach beyond the scope of the express pre-
emption provision are not preempted by the federal statute.44
the "ultimate touchstone of pre[]emption analysis." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. See
also Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963) ("[W]e
are not to conclude that Congress legislated the ouster of this [state] statute ... in the
absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect."); King v. Collagen
Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1133 (1st Cir.) (acknowledging that "preemption does not occur
unless Congress so intended"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
41. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (establishing that Congress may ex-
pressly preempt or its intent to preempt may be inferred). See also Cipollone, 505 U.S.
at 516 (remarking that Congress' intent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's lan-
guage or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose") (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at
525). The Supreme Court declared that preemption depends upon "the relationship be-
tween state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are
written." Jones, 430 U.S. at 526. See also Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18
(1st Cir. 1994) (noting that state law claims are preempted if they differ from federal re-
quirements "as applied").
42. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993). See also Shaw,
463 U.S. at 106-08 (examining text and structure of statute to find preemptive purpose).
However, "speaking expressly" does not always mean "speaking clearly." Robert S.
Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59
Mo. L. REV. 895, 900 (1994) ("The fact that Congress. has spoken expressly with re-
spect to preemption ... does not mean that it has spoken clearly."). But cf. Marilyn P.
Westerfield, Comment, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does Congress Want?,
58 U. CIN. L. REV. 263, 265 (1989) (suggesting that when Congress or a federal agency
expressly states that preemption of state regulations is to occur, the results are "usually
clear and unambiguous").
For examples of express preemption, see Adler & Mann, supra, at 900 (providing as an
example the Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-84 (1994)); Philip H.
Corboy & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Law: Federalism and
the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVoC. 435, 446 n.53 (1992)
(listing several examples of express preemption); Laura K. Jortberg, Who Should Bear
the Burden of Experimental Medical Device Testing: The Preemptive Scope of the
Medical Device Amendments under Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 43 DEPAUL L. REV.
963, 967-68 (1994) (referring to the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a)-(b) (1994), as an example of express preemption); Westerfield, supra, at 265-
66 (setting forth regulations concerning labeling requirements of aspirin products and
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431, repealed
by Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379, as examples of
express preemption by Congress).
43. Weber v. Heaney, 995 F.2d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 1993). Where Congress has en-
acted an express preemption provision, "the task of statutory construction must ... fo-
cus on the plain wording of the [provision], which necessarily contains the best evi-
dence of Congress' [affirmative] pre[]emptive intent." CSX Transp., Inc., 113 S. Ct. at
1737.
44. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d
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Even in the absence of express preemption, courts will imply pre-
emption in three situations: first, when Congress passes legislation
that is so comprehensive that no room remains for supplementary state
regulation; 45 second, when the federal interest so greatly predominates
that it precludes the enforcement of state laws;" and third, when a di-
rect conflict arises between state law and federal law, making compli-
ance with both impossible.47
Just as the Framers of the Constitution preserved state autonomy
48
and delegated numerous powers to the states,49 courts "favor" state
law by interpreting federal laws with a presumption against preemp-
tion,5° whether express or implied. This presumption is particularly
1108, 1112 (4th Cir.) (explaining that when Congress does not expressly state its in-
tent, there is a presumption against preemption of state law), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988). See also Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1489 (D. Kan. 1987)
(declaring that in the "absence of express presumption, there is a strong presumption
that Congress did not intend to displace state law").
45. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713. See also Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516
(finding state law preempted if federal law "so thoroughly occupies a legislative field"
that Congress allowed the states no additional room to regulate); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983)
(indicating that Congress' intent to supersede state law may be found from a federal regu-
lation scheme where Congress left no room to supplement it).
46. Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230, rev'd sub nom. Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947)).
47. Id. at 713. See also Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 204 (articulating that congressional
intent to preempt may be inferred only if state law actually conflicts with federal law);
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(supporting the concept that implied preemption occurs when state law conflicts with
and frustrates the purpose and objectives of the federal law). A direct conflict can occur
in three situations: where compliance with a state and a federal law is not possible;
when Congress' objective in passing the federal law is frustrated by the existence of a
state law; and when state law interferes with the exercise of a federally-created right.
Ausness, supra note 26, at 196-97.
48. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations, 330 U.S. 767, 780
(1947) ("Any indulgence in construction should be in favor of the States, because
Congress can speak with drastic clarity whenever it chooses to assure full federal author-
ity, completely displacing the States.").
49. Jortberg, supra note 42, at 966 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). Jortberg notes Madison's belief that the states
administer "all of the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties and properties of the people." Id. Jortberg concludes that as a result, the states
have historically taken responsibility to govern "those areas that concern the lives of
their citizens." Id.
50. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992). See also Maryland
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (stressing that there is ordinarily a presumption
against preemption). Consequently, the proponent of preemption "bears a heavy bur-
den," Pennsylvania Medical Soc'y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 846 (3d Cir. 1991), be-
cause courts start from the proposition that preemption of state law is disfavored "in the
absence of persuasive reasons--either that the nature of the regulated subject matter
permits no other conclusion, or that Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida
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strong when the laws relate to areas traditionally occupied by the
states."' Thus, preemption of actions within a state's historic police
powers "should not be lightly inferred. 52 The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that the regulation of health and safety matters has pri-
marily and historically been a matter of exclusive state concern, and
therefore preemption of state law should not occur in the absence of
Congress' clear intent to supersede the state law.53 It follows, then,
that the courts, upon finding that Congress did not intend to preempt
state laws, conclude that Congress yields judgment on these histori-
cally state-governed issues to the states. 4
B. History and Operation of the Medical Device Amendments 5
1. Background of the MDA
In 1938, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments, which
gave the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") the authority to regu-
late medical devices under the FDCA 6 The Amendments granted the
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142.
51. See Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1432 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (noting that where a state's historic powers are in danger of being superseded,
there is a strong presumption against preemption).
52. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 21 (1987).
53. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985). See also Maryland, 451 U.S. at 746 (indicating a "basic assumption" that
Congress did not intend to displace state tort law); Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
316 (1981) (same); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (listing examples of
laws showing that the states possess broad authority to regulate health and safety con-
cerns); Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 24, 255 (1947) (noting that when a state's his-
toric police powers are at issue, federal preemption will not occur unless Congress
clearly intended this result); Toy Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Blumenthal, 986 F.2d 615, 624
(2d Cir. 1993) (holding that small parts regulations issued pursuant to Hazardous Sub-
stances Act did not preempt a Connecticut general statute); Shiley, 858 F. Supp. at 1432
(noting the strong presumption against preemption when the laws at issue relate to
health and safety).
54. Jortberg, supra note 42, at 966 & n.28 (citing Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978)). The Court in Raymond Motor discussed its reluctance
to invalidate state legislation in the "field of safety where the propriety of local regula-
tion has long been recognized." Raymond Motor, 434 U.S. at 443. See also Haudrich v.
Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 214 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (acknowledging that the
Supreme Court is conscious of the deference due the states), aff'd, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 14,513 (111. Jan. 18, 1996).
55. This section serves as a general background to the MDA of 1976. For a detailed
analysis of specific provisions of the MDA, see infra part IV.A.
56. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified
as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1994)); S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071, amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301- 395
(1994). See infra note 72 for the citation to the current statute granting the FDA this au-
thority.
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FDA limited power to seize adulterated devices and to criminally pros-
ecute the manufacturers or distributors of such devices.5 7 Under the
Act, the FDA could only exercise this authority after manufacturers of-
fered their medical devices into interstate commerce." When manufac-
turers began introducing more technologically-advanced, complex
products in the 1960s,' 9 however, the need for FDA approval before a
medical device's distribution into the market became inevitable6
In 1969, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare formed an
expert committee 6 1 to research and recommend procedures by which
standards could be created for regulating medical devices. 62 Ulti-
mately, this committee's ideas and recommendations formed much of
the foundation for the 1976 Medical Device Amendments. 63 Through
the Amendments, Congress sought to provide the FDA with a "com-
prehensive, yet flexible legislative mechanism" to protect the public
health by ensuring safe and effective regulation 64 of the industry's
57. Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (1989).
58. Id. Additionally, the FDA spent much time and valuable resources in carrying the
burden of proving that even the simplest products were fraudulent or unsafe. Id.
59. The manufacturers introduced new devices such as heart pacemakers and kidney
dialysis units. Kronenberg, supra note 37, at 563.
60. Id. at 563-64.
6 1. The group was known as the "Cooper Committee" and was chaired by the then-Di-
rector of the National Heart and Lung Institute, Dr. Theodore Cooper. Leflar, supra note
57, at 6 n.15.
62. Truitt, supra note 35, at 156 (citing James S. Benson et al., The FDA's Reg-
ulation of Medical Devices: A Decade of Change, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 495
(1988)). The committee's report uncovered 10,000 device-related injuries and 751
deaths for the preceding 10 years. Leflar, supra note 57, at 6. The purpose of the legis-
lation was to correct and prevent the recurrence of these injuries from medical devices.
Id. at 7.
63. See id. at 6-7; 21 U.S.C. §§ 360(c)-360(k) (1994). The 1976 Amendments were
drafted at the end of what became known as the "consumer decade," a period from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1970s during which numerous consumer protection laws were enacted,
many of which fell within the health and safety arena. See Adler & Mann, supra note 42,
at 896 n.3 (illustrating several such laws).
64. Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right
Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 511,
511 (1988). See also JOHN B. DUBECK & MELVIN S. DROZEN, MEDICAL DEVICES AND THE
LAW 11 (1991) (explaining that Congress promulgated the MDA of 1976 after years of
"ineffective regulation"). The MDA was enacted largely in response to the "public
outcry" following the injuries suffered by women using the Dalkon Shield contraceptive
device. See Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (C.D. Cal.
1994) (describing the medical device "crisis moment" as arriving with the Dalkon
Shield). Within a few years of its introduction, the Dalkon Shield was linked with a
5.1% pregnancy rate, a 5% infection rate, and a 26.4% removal rate for medical reasons.
DUBECK & DROZEN, supra, at 12. By mid-1975, the device had been linked to 16 deaths
and 25 miscarriages. H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1976). Several wit-
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numerous medical devices.65
2. The Purpose of the MDA
Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments in response to a
rapid technological change in the medical devices industry.66 With
new, more complicated devices continuously entering the market, ex-
isting laws appeared inadequate to protect consumers from these de-
vices, which could pose serious hazards if improperly designed, inad-
equately tested, or improperly used.67. As a sponsor of the bill ex-
plained:
"[W]ithout [the legislation,] the American people will continue
to be subjected to indefensible risk of illness, injury and even
death.... The legislation [was] written so that the benefit of the
doubt is always given to the consumer. After all it is the con-
sumer who pays with his health and his life for medical device
malfunctions. ' 68
In enacting the MDA, Congress also expressed its intention to en-
courage the research and development of medical devices by providing
a uniform regulatory scheme. 69 Thus, the MDA of 1976 reflected
nesses testifying during a Health Subcommittee Hearing in 1975, including the FDA
Commissioner, concluded that many of the deaths and illnesses attributable to the
Dalkon Shield could have been prevented if the legislation provided in the reported bill
had been in effect when the device was developed. Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare. Corp.,
842 F. Supp. 747, 753-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing S. REP. No. 33, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071).
65. The medical device industry supplies the American health care system with ap-
proximately 1700 different types of medical devices, generating over 41,000 separate
products. Adler, supra note 64, at 511.
66. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
67. S. REP. No. 33, at 1075.
68. 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (1975) (emphasis added) (statement of Sen. Ted
Kennedy). The purpose of the MDA is to protect the public health by assuring the rea-
sonable safety and effectiveness of all medical devices intended for human use that were
on the market before and after the statute was enacted. H.R. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 51, 51, 53-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1103, 1103, 1105-07.
Congress feared that medical devices presented major risks to patients and that such
risks would increase without regulation. 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Therefore, the Amendments gave the FDA comprehensive regulatory author-
ity over medical devices. H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6-13 (1976); see
infra note 72.
69. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 360j(g)(1) (1994). The court in Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,
56 F.3d 1335, 1339 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996), suggested
that the need for public safety could be balanced with continued development. Id. Other
courts and commentators agree. See, e.g., King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130,
1138 (1st Cir.) (Aldrich, J., concurring) (citing the 1976 MDA's legislative history to
show Congress' intent to encourage research and provide protection to users of medical
devices), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993); Truitt, supra note 35, at 157 (highlighting
the three goals of the MDA, including assessing public protection and guarding against
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Congress' objectives to examine more thoroughly the medical device
industry, while refraining from suppressing production and innova-
tion.7" However, as several courts and commentators have recog-
nized, the primary goal of the Amendments remained to protect public
health and safety.7
3. The FDA's Medical Device Regulatory Scheme
The 1976 Amendments authorized the FDA to issue regulations de-
signed to ensure the safety and effectiveness of all medical devices.72
restrictions suppressing innovation).
The King court recognized public health as a valid federal purpose and suggested that
"Congress can reasonably weigh possible loss to the idiosyncratic few against benefits
to the public generally." King, 983 F.2d at 1138 (Aldrich, J., concurring). A concur-
ring judge thus conceded that the principal emphasis of the Act was on the protection of
the individual user, but highlighted Congress' intent to encourage research and devel-
opment and to market new devices without delay. Id. (Aldrich, J., concurring) In doing
so, the judge concluded that "[p]erfection is impossible and a few individuals may be de-
nied full protection at the cost of benefitting the rest." Id. (Aldrich, J., concurring). The
House version of the MDA provided a cautionary, instructive note in just such a circum-
stance:
[T]he Committee has developed a balanced regulatory proposal intended to
assure that the public is protected from unsafe and ineffective medical devices,
that health professionals have more confidence in the devices they use or pre-
scribe, and that innovations in medical device technology are not stifled by
unnecessary restrictions. The bill . . . would prohibit . . . the marketing of a
new device until the safety and effectiveness of the device has been established
.... [The bill] reflects the need to develop innovative new devices, consis-
tent with the need to protect the subjects of device research.
H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). One commentator noted that these
two major substantive objectives of the law are in many instances mutually contradic-
tory. Leflar, supra note 57, at 7.
70. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1339. See also Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 14 (1st
Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress was balancing the need for regulation against the in-
terest in new devices).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969) ("[T]he
Act's overriding purpose [is] to protect the public health."). See also King, 983 F.2d at
1138 ("Concededly, the ... principal emphasis [of the MDA is the] protection of the in-
dividual.") (Aldrich, J., concurring); United States v. Diapulse Corp. of Am., 457 F.2d
25, 28 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining that the primary purpose of the FDCA, of which the
MDA is a part, was to protect the public from unsafe products and the "safeguarding of
the public health by enforcement of certain standards of purity and effectiveness"). The
court in Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989), ex-
tended itself even further and declared that the "sole purpose of the Act is to protect and
preserve the public health." Id. (emphasis added). See also Jortberg, supra note 42, at
978-79 (noting that as a result of the vast amount of deaths and illnesses caused by the
Dalkon Shield device, Congress' primary concern in introducing the MDA lay in con-
sumer health and safety).
72. While Congress charged the Secretary of Health and Human Services with the
general responsibility of administering the FDCA, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 371(a), 393
(1994), the Secretary delegated its authority to the FDA. See H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th
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Congress recognized that medical devices differ in both composition
and risk.73 Congress therefore created three different classes of de-
vices, and instructed the FDA to regulate more intensely those devices
that posed a higher degree of risk to potential users. 4
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 510 (1995). In addition, 21 C.F.R.'§ 814.1
(1995) sets forth the general requirements for all devices subject to premarket approval.
Id.
However, Congress, various federal agencies, courts, numerous commentators, and the
FDA itself, recognize that the FDA's efforts in this regard have been less than com-
pletely successful because the FDA simply does not have the resources to oversee effec-
tively such an active industry. See, e.g., David A. Kessler et al., The Federal Regulation
of Medical Devices, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 357, 357 (1987) (noting that "Itihe failure of
the FDA to implement several major statutory provisions intended to ensure the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices leads to one of two conclusions: either the safety
and effectiveness of medical devices are not being ensured or the provisions are super-
fluous"). See also Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1434 (C.D.
Cal. 1994) (reflecting that federal investigations illustrate that the pace of the medical
device industry far exceeds the FDA's ability to control it); Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc.,
642 N.E.2d 206, 210-11 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (opining that "[t]he apparent inability of
the [FDA] to investigate, to issue approval, and to monitor compliance suggests that it
should not be the sole source of protection for the consumers of this country"), aff'd, 2
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 14,513 (III. Jan. 18, 1996); Fogal v. Steinfeld, 620 N.Y.S.2d
875, 883 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (questioning why, with the FDA's serious backlog of
products awaiting approval, its less than stringent standards and serious staff shortage,
"the courts appear to ignore what Wall Street and the New York Times clearly know: that
the mere fact that a product or medical device is approved by the FDA does not automati-
cally mean it is safe") (quoting Stuart Schlesinger, Plaintiff's Alleged Misuse of
Defective Item, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 1994, at 3); STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101ST
CONG., 2D SESS., THE BJORK-SHILEY HEART VALVE: "EARN AS You LEARN" 39 (Comm.
Print 1990) (stating that "[t]he environment of voluntary compliance in which the FDA
and medical device manufacturers currently operate is woefully ineffective in instances in
which a firm elects not to cooperate with the FDA"). Thus, the FDA often relies on
"'private lawsuits to know what's going on to protect the American public."' Mitchell
Zuckoff, 2 US agencies side with Mo. women in Bard catheter suit, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
5, 1994, at 19, 21 (quoting Jeffrey Newman, attorney for plaintiffs in Talbott v. C.R.
Bard, 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995)).
73. Truitt, supra note 35, at 15.
74. Kessler, supra note 72, at 364. "Class I" covers devices for which general con-
trols offer reasonable assurance that the devices are safe and effective and those devices
that are neither intended for significant medical use nor likely to threaten human health.
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(I)(A) (1994). Examples of Class I devices include tongue depres-
sors, elastic bandages, and ice bags. Adler, supra note 64, at 512.
Medical devices in "Class II" include such items as syringes, hearing aids, and bone
plates. Id. at 513. Such devices require higher performance standards because general
controls alone under Class I fail to provide reasonable assurance of their safety and effec-
tiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(l)(B) (1994). See Mary G. Boguslaski, Classification
and Performance Standards under the 1976 Medical Device Amendments, 40 FOOD DRUG
COSM. L.J. 421, 430-31 (1995) for further discussion of performance standards.
"Class III" devices include pacemakers, IUDs, artificial joints, and artificial hearts.
Adler, supra note 64, at 513. These devices either present a potentially unreasonable
risk of illness or injury, or include those devices intended for significant medical use.
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The MDA requires manufacturers of Class III medical devices,
which pose the highest degree of risk," to obtain approval through
one of two methods before their products reach the marketplace.76 The
first method, premarket approval application ("PMA"),77 requires that
manufacturers conduct extensive testing to obtain clinical results that
demonstrate the safety and effectiveness of a device.78 Both FDA staff
members and outside experts must approve the PMA before the FDA
will approve the device for commercial use. 79 Thus, preparing a PMA
requires a great amount of time and expense, and must be completed
before a new medical device enters the market.80
Under the second method, premarket notification,8! a company may
market and distribute a new device without first obtaining FDA ap-
proval if the manufacturer establishes that the device is "substantially
equivalent" to a device that has already been approved.82 The FDA re-
quires significantly less information for premarket notification than for
a PMA application. 3
21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C). Class Ill devices require premarket approval and cannot be
marketed until extensive testing in both the lab and clinic prove their safety and effec-
tiveness. Id.
For highly-detailed descriptions of the MDA's classification scheme, see BRADLEY M.
THOMPSON, FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 41-58 (1995); Boguslaski, supra, at
421-22. See also Kessler, supra note 72, at 357 (suggesting necessary revisions to the
MDA's classification and regulatory schemes).
7 5. See supra note 74.
76. Ausness, supra note 26, at 226.
77. This requirement is established in the MDA at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C), 360e(1994). A PMA must be submitted for all Class III devices. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)..
However, most devices in fact proceed to market under a second method, even though
this method does not constitute premarket or FDA approval. Adler & Mann, supra note
42, at 915; see infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of this second
method. For a comprehensive discussion of the premarket approval process, see
THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 141-62.
78. Ausness, supra note 26, at 226.
79. Id. (citing Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Bruce F. Mackler, Food and Drug Administration
Regulation and Products Liability: Strong Sword, Weak Shield, 22 TORT & INS. L.J.
194, 208-09 (1987)).
80. Truitt, supra note 35, at 159.
8 1. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)(C)(i) (1994). Premarket notification is also referred to as
the "510(k) mechanism" and "substantial equivalence" method. See Adler & Mann,
supra note 42, at 914.
82. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1103-19; Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 914. See also
THOMPSON, supra note 74, at 61-104 (providing an expansive discussion of premarket
notification procedure, substantial equivalence, the 510(k) process, and special rules);
Ausness, supra note 26, at 226 (noting that "a second procedure is available for any
device that is 'substantially equivalent' to a device that was in commercial distribution
before passage of the Amendments in 1976").
83. Ausness, supra note 26, at 226; Truitt, supra note 35, at 159. The approval times
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Initially, most Class III devices reached the market through
premarket notification and therefore enjoyed "significantly less
stringent FDA regulation" before entering the market.8 4 The lack of
regulation under the second method, along with increased use of this
method, however, caused Congress to amend the premarket
notification requirements.85 Manufacturers seeking premarket
notification must now disclose more information about the safety and
effectiveness of the devices, and in some cases must also provide
clinical data. 6
4. The General Rule of the MDA and Related FDA Regulations
The intended scope of state law preemption under the Medical De-
vice Amendments is widely disputed. Section 360k(a), the MDA's
express preemption provision, prohibits states from imposing "any re-
quirement ... which is different from, or in addition to," any specific
federal requirement or counterpart addressing the "safety or effective-
ness" of medical devices. 7 This provision, however, fails to define
the word "requirement," leaving open the question of what actions the
for the two procedures differ greatly: it involves an average of 20 hours for premarket
notification versus 1200 hours for PMA. Truitt, supra note 35, at 159.
The statute requires manufacturers wishing to sell or distribute a substantially equiva-
lent device to notify the FDA 90 days before doing so, indicate in which of the three
classes the device falls, and ensure that the device complies with all the applicable regu-
latory requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (1994); Adler, supra note 64, at 514.
84. Paul H. Sunshine, The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device Amendments of
1976, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 191, 198-99 (1995). Under this substantial equivalence de-
termination, however, a device does not receive the official designation of FDA ap-
proval. 21 C.F.R. § 807.97 (1995). See also 49 Fed. Reg. 36,332 (1984) (noting that
an FDA determination "that a postamendments device is 'substantially equivalent' is...
not a determination that the device is not adulterated or misbranded and is otherwise safe
and effective"); Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 915. To some courts, this factor along
with the other differences between PMA and premarket notification procedures makes a
significant impact in preemption cases, while to others, the issue is inapposite.
Compare Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir.) (suggesting that
the PMA process was a determining factor in preemption), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86
(1993) with Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1281-82 (Haw. 1992)
(stating claims brought for injuries caused by a substantially equivalent device do not
contradict FDA approval).
85. The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 4(a), 104 Stat.
4511, 4515 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1994)).
86. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(l)(A)(ii) (1994). See also Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at
915 n.100 (explaining how manufacturers must comply with premarket notification re-
quirements under the new law).
87. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). Thus, § 360k(a) preempts state-imposed require-
ments only when the requirements differ from or add to a previously established FDA re-
quirement and relate to the safety of the regulated device. Id.
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statute prohibits states from imposing.88 In addition, under section
360k(b), the FDA may exempt from section 360k(a) some state re-
quirements, which means that the state may obtain FDA authority to
impose requirements on manufacturers.8 9
Section 360h addresses the FDA's enforcement authority with re-
gard to ridding the market of hazardous devices.' This section gives
the FDA the power to require the repair, replacement,' or refund 9' of a
device presenting an "unreasonable risk" of harm to the public health
due to improper design or manufacturing.92 Further, the MDA's sav-
ings clause, found in section 360h(d), states that "[c]ompliance with
an order issued under the section shall not relieve any person from li-
ability under Federal or State law., 93
In an attempt to understand the scope of preemption under the
MDA, numerous courts and commentators have turned to the FDA's
own regulations and interpretations for guidance. 94 Section 808.1(b)
of the regulations states that section 360k, with its express preemption
provision, applies to any state requirement "having the force and effect
of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court
decision)." 95 Nevertheless, section 808.1 (d) provides that the MDA
preempts state or local requirements only when the FDA has estab-
lished comparable regulations, or if the MDA itself created "specific
requirements" that apply to a particular medical device. 96 This regula-
tion further states that the MDA does not preempt specific "[s]tate or
88. Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948, 951-52 (N.D. Cal. 1994). In addi-
tion, § 360k(b), drafted simultaneously with § 360k(a), further reveals that Congress
delegated power to the FDA to "exempt from" § 360k(a) certain requirements from pre-
emption if particular conditions are met.
89. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (1994).
90. 21 U.S.C. § 360h (1994); Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426,
1434-35 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(2)(A)-(C).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(l)(A). The FDA must determine: 1) that a device unreason-
ably places the health of the general public at substantial risk; 2) that the FDA might
reasonably believe "the device was not properly designed and manufactured with refer-
ence to the state of the art" which existed when the device was originally designed and
manufactured; 3) that the agency might reasonably believe that no person other than the
"manufacturer, importer, distributor, or retailer" failed to exercise due care in the servic-
ing and use of the device; and 4) that notification to the public would prove insufficient
to remove the unreasonable risk of harm. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(l)(A)(i)-(iv).
93. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (1994). See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1342-
47 (11 th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
94. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
95. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b) (1995). Courts disagree about whether the term "court deci-
sion" includes common law tort claims. See infra notes 283-88 and accompanying text.
96. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995).
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local requirements of general applicability," including the Uniform
Commercial Code and state unfair trade practices laws.97 Additionally,
section 808.1 (d) provides that in determining whether the MDA pre-
empts a state requirement, courts should examine how the state has
interpreted and enforced that requirement.98
C. The Landmark Decision on Preemption in Tort Cases:
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
The issue of whether a federal statute can preempt state tort law has
been raised relatively recently.99 In Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.,'00 the Supreme Court examined the broad issue of federal pre-
emption of state common law tort claims.' ° ' Although the issue in
Cipollone did not involve the MDA, many courts have looked to
Cipollone for guidance when analyzing the preemption issue in MDA
cases.10
2
97. The text of § 808.1(d)(1) provides:
Section [360k(a)] does not preempt State or local requirements of general
applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other prod-
ucts in addition to devices (e.g., requirements such as general electrical codes,
and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness)), or to unfair trade
practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices.
Id. "If the MDA does not preempt general bodies of law such as the UCC .... [then] it
would not preempt broader, more established bodies of general law such as common law
torts." Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 940.
98. This regulation states that "[i]n determining whether such a [state] requirement is
preempted, the determinative factor is how the requirement is interpreted and enforced by
the state or local government and not the literal language of the [state] statute, which
may be identical to a provision in the act." 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995).
99. See Susan B. Foote, Administrative Preemption: An Experiment in Regulatory
Federalism, 70 VA. L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1984) (acknowledging that "[uintil recently,
administrative preemption provisions [such as the MDA have] attracted little ...judi-
cial ...attention"). Courts have offered various reasons for the doctrine's tardy en-
trance into the legal arena. See Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 207 (111.
App. Ct. 1994) (suggesting that "respect for federalism has protected . . . States' [court
systems] from intrusion in an area that has been recognized as a matter for local rather
than Federal law since the inception of the nation"), aff'd, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
14,513 (I11. Jan. 18, 1996).
In 1984, the Supreme Court first discussed preemption of state law action in Silkwood
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248-58 (1984). The Silkwood Court rejected the
notion that by enacting a federal law, Congress intended to forbid the states from
providing state law remedies for injuries suffered due to plutonium contamination. Id. at
251.
100. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion).
101. Id. (plurality opinion).
102. "The courts have become particularly aggressive" in preempting claims because
of the Cipollone decision, resulting in nearly unanimous findings of preemption. Adler
& Mann, supra note 42, at 897-98, 916-17. Nevertheless, some experts question
whether Cipollone supports such an expansive approach to preemption because of the
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In Cipollone, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 (" 1965 Act")
and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 ("1969 Act")
preempted the plaintiffs five state law claims.'0 3 Relying on well-es-
tablished preemption principles, a majority held that the 1965 Act did
not preempt the plaintiff s state law tort claims.' 4 However, in a more
extensive analysis, only a plurality held that the 1969 Act preempted
some of the plaintiff's state tort claims, and did not preempt other
claims.10 5 In making both of these determinations, the Court empha-
courts' "inadequate and illogical" analyses, which in essence provide that because the
MDA uses the same word, "requirement," which the Supreme Court found preemptive in
Cipollone, the MDA preempts state common law as a. "requirement" as well. Id. at 917.
103. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516-24 (plurality opinion). These claims included: fail-
ing to provide adequate warnings about the health risks of smoking; expressly warrant-
ing products that were dangerous to consumers' health; attempting to neutralize statu-
tory warning effects; ignoring medical advice on the dangers of smoking; and
conspiring to prevent medical evidence from reaching the general public. Id. at 524-30
(plurality opinion).
104. Id. at 530 (plurality opinion). Six Justices joined Justice Stevens's majority
opinion regarding the 1965 Act. Id. at 508 (plurality opinion). The text of the 1965
Act provides, in relevant part:
Preemption:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement
required by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette pack-
age.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in confor-
mity with the provisions of this Act.
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(a)-(b), 79 Stat.
282, 283 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (1994)). Under the 1965
Act, the Court analyzed each of the plaintiff's state tort claims in light of the express
language in the statute's preemption provision, which was to be interpreted narrowly,
and by giving effect to the presumption against preemption of state police power regula-
tions. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518-20 (plurality opinion). As later courts noted, the
Cipollone plurality carefully construed the preemption provision to "extend no further
than its language warranted" in order to respect federal-state relations and to explicitly
emphasize the fact that a state's police powers may not be superseded by a federal act un-
less a clear and manifest congressional purpose exists. King v. Collagen Corp., 983
F.2d 1130, 1134 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
The Cipollone Court also found that the notion that there exists "no general, inherent
conflict between federal pre[]emption of state warning requirements and the continued
vitality of state common-law damages actions" conformed to the 1965 Act's stated pur-
pose. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion). Significantly, the Court ex-
plained that the term "regulation" most naturally refers to positive enactments by those
bodies, not to common law damage actions. Id. at 518-19 (plurality opinion). Thus, by
determining that Congress spoke "precisely and narrowly" when it stated in the 1965
Act that "[n]o statement ... shall be required .... ," the Court concluded that the 1965 Act
did not preempt the plaintiff's state law tort claims. Id. at 518-20 (plurality opinion).
105. Id. at 530-31 (plurality opinion). The 1969 Act provides as follows: "No re-
quirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law
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sized that courts must closely examine the plain language of a statute to
ascertain the meaning Congress intended."
Several Justices disagreed with the finding that the 1969 Act pre-
empted some of the plaintiff's claims, believing that the Court was ob-
ligated to infer preemption only where Congress' intent to preempt
was "clear and manifest."' 0 7 These Justices argued that the distinct
differences between the effect of tort law, and that of positive
legislative enactments, significantly weakened the conclusion that the
1969 Act's "no requirement or prohibition" language encompassed
state tort law. 08
HI. DISCUSSION
Before the Cipollone decision in 1992, few courts had addressed
preemption under the MDA.' °9 After Cipollone, however, defendant-
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act." Public Health Cigarette Smok-
ing Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87, 88 (1969) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994)). The 1969 Act, the Court concluded, created some preemp-
tive effect with regard to state common law claims. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 523-24
(plurality opinion). The Court reached this conclusion by explaining that the 1969
Act's phrase, "'[n]o requirement or prohibition[,]' [swept] broadly" and failed to distin-
guish between positive enactments and the common law. Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
The Court recognized that the 1969 Act's legislative history indicated "that Congress
was primarily concerned with positive enactments by States and localities." Id.
(plurality opinion). Nonetheless, it felt compelled to give effect to the 1969 Act's plain
language unless "good reason" existed for it to believe Congress intended a more
restrictive meaning. Id. at 521-22 (plurality opinion) (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983)). The Court found that it did have "good reason to believe" that
Congress intended to "reach beyond" the positive state and local enactments and include
common law damage claims. Id. at 522 (plurality opinion). The Court thus concluded
that the 1969 Act preempted failure-to-warn and fraudulent misrepresentation claims "to
the extent that those claims [relied] on omissions or inclusions in" a manufacturer's
advertising or promotions, and did not preempt express warranty claims, fraudulent
misrepresentation claims which concealed material facts, or intentional conspiracies to
misrepresent or conceal material facts. Id. at 530-31 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 520-21 (plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 542 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To these
Justices, the "clear and manifest" principle compelled the conclusion that state
common-law damage actions were not preempted by the 1969 Act. Id. at 541-42
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Justices noted that every
court of appeals to consider this question did not find express preemption under the 1969
Act. Id. at 542 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. See id. at 534-39 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting § 5b of the 1969 Act and stating that "the plurality's conclusion that the 1969
Act pre[]empt[ed] at least some common-law damages claims" was nothing "short of
baffling").
109. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 916. This lack of litigation may have reflected
"the prevailing view that compliance with FDA standards constituted a 'strong sword'
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manufacturers started raising, and courts began considering, the
preemptive scope of the MDA." 0 As a result, three different inter-
pretations of the MDA emerged. Some courts hold that the MDA pre-
empts all state tort claims."' Other courts interpret the MDA to pre-
empt some, but not all, state tort claims. 1 2 Finally, some federal and
state courts hold that the MDA does not preempt any state tort
claims. 3
A. The Current Majority View: The MDA Preempts All State
Common Law Claims Arising From Injuries
Suffered from Defective Medical Devices
Most circuits that have addressed the preemptive scope of the MDA
have found that the statute preempts all state tort claims." 4 These
courts generally interpret the MDA to preempt a state requirement that
"establishes a new substantive requirement for [a] device in a regulated
area.'"15 The courts imposing total preemption also conclude that sec-
tion 360k "'sweeps broadly,"' and encompasses common law tort ac-
tions within its preemptive scope if they are "different from, or in ad-
dition to" the federal law. 1 6 Finally, courts tending to preempt all
for plaintiffs, but a 'weak shield' for defendants." Id. (citing Gibbs & Mackler, supra
note 79, at 243). In other words, a manufacturer's non-compliance "with an FDA stan-
dard generally triggered a finding in court'of negligence per se .... [B]ut the manufac-
turer's compliance with an FDA standard provided little protection against tort claims of
a plaintiff." Id.
110. A number of these courts seemed to view Cipollone as giving "a green light to
find preemption in product liability claims," particularly those relating to medical de-
vices. Id. at 896-97 n.8, 904 (listing 22 decisions where courts held that the MDA pre-
empted claims brought with regard to such products as heart valves, artificial hips, and
intraocular lenses).
111. See infra part III.A.
112. See infra part III.B.
113. See infra part III.C.
1 14. See, e.g., Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d Cir.) (finding prod-
ucts liability and negligence actions against manufacturer claims regarding ocular lenses
preempted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994); Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42
F.3d 1167, 1168-69 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding products liability claims in regards to con-
tact lens disinfection system preempted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Mendes
v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (ruling that plaintiff's allegations
of negligent manufacture and distribution, failure-to-warn, and breach of implied war-
ranty claims relating to a defective pacemaker were preempted); Stamps v. Collagen
Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 (5th Cir.) (finding causes of action based on defective de-
sign, inadequate warnings, and negligent failure-to-warn preempted in regard to the
Zyderm anti-wrinkle device), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993); King v. Collagen
Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1133 (1st Cir.) (holding plaintiff's seven state tort claims
relating to the Zyderm device preempted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993).
115. King, 983 F.2d at 1134-35 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995)).
116. Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (plurality
opinion)); 21 U.S.C. § 360 k(a) (1994). See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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state tort claims determine that, if successful, a plaintiffs claims would
create state-imposed requirements on the manufacturer that differ from,
or surpass, the FDA's regulations concerning the safety and effective-
ness of the device at issue." 7
In Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.," 8 for example, the First Circuit held
that section 360k(a) of the MDA preempted all of the plaintiffs' state
tort claims." 9 The case arose after Eunice Beavers underwent a coro-
nary angioplasty procedure in which a catheter manufactured by Bard
failed to deflate, allegedly causing her death. 20 Several years later, the
United States brought a criminal action against Bard and six of its em-
ployees.' 2 ' Evidence in the criminal case showed that Bard knew that
its catheters were not properly deflating in patients' coronary arteries,
and knew that this defect could lead to fatalities. 22 The court found
that Bard also ignored the FDA notification and approval requirements
by filing fraudulent, misleading, and inaccurate documentation with
the FDA in order to obtain approval to sell its catheters.' 23
Bard pled guilty in the criminal case to 391 felonies arising out of its
willful and knowing violations of federal law.'24 Pursuant to a bind-
117. King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36.
118. 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Feb.
16, 1996) (No. 95-1321); see supra note 4.
119. Id. at 31.
120. Talbott 1, 865 F. Supp. at 41.
1 21. Id. at 41-42. Bard had notified the FDA of Mrs. Beavers's death, but had stated
that it was "'unknown"' whether the catheter's deflation problems were "occurring with
greater frequency or severity than described on the device's labelling." Id. at 41.
(quoting Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at 34, C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp at
41 (No. 94-10394). The FDA became aware of Bard's criminal violations when a
competitor of Bard's "tipped off" the FDA to the violations. See Sentencing Hearing
Transcript at 39, United States v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 287 (D. Mass. 1994)
(No. 93-10279-WF) (confirming this fact). In 1990, the FDA forced "a recall of the
Mini Profile catheter." Talbott 1, 865 F. Supp. at 41. Bard never notified Mrs.
Beavers's family or physicians about the deflation problems. Id. Instead, the family
learned about the catheter's malfunctions from a newspaper reporter. Id.
122. Id. at 41. Bard received at least 28 complaints from physicians and others that
the Mini Profile catheters failed during use. Id. Bard did not notify the FDA or recall the
catheters, but instead redesigned them without FDA approval. Id. See C.R. Bard, Inc.,
848 F. Supp. at 289 ("It appears to this court that as a result of the subversion of the
FDA process designed to assure that medical products are safe and effective, Bard made
inherently risky procedures more dangerous.").
123. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 288-89. The district court also found that Bard
knowingly and willfully made false statements to the FDA and failed to submit required
reports. Id. at 289. "Bard's crimes [had] deprived the FDA, doctors, and their patients of
the benefit of crucial information." C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 289. Based on this
inaccurate information supplied by Bard, however, the FDA approved the Mini Profile
catheters for distribution to the public. Talbott 1, 865 F. Supp. at 41.
124. Id. at 288-89 (listing the counts as: I count of conspiracy, 17 counts of mail
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ing plea agreement, the court imposed a $61,000,000 penalty in crimi-
nal fines and civil settlement, and a special assessment of $78,200.125
The court noted one problem with the plea agreement, however, stat-
ing that the victims of Bard's wrongdoing could not obtain restitution
in the case.126 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the victims could
bring civil damage actions, which would provide the most appropriate
means for victims to seek redress.
27
fraud, 8 counts of submitting false statements to the FDA, 363 counts of shipping adul-
terated medical devices, and 2 counts of failing to submit required reports to the FDA). In
the words of the district court, "[tihese are serious criminal violations." Id. at 288. The
court also recognized that death and serious injuries were the kind of foreseeable conse-
quences that may result from violations of law designed to protect the general public
welfare. Id. at 288-89 (emphasizing that the people at Bard failed in their responsibility
to comply with laws designed to protect the public health and safety, especially those
products used to care for seriously ill individuals).
Bard acknowledged the serious implications of its behavior in a letter from its presi-
dent to its shareholders on October 18, 1993: "Illegal behavior is indefensible. It will
not be tolerated now or in the future." Letter from William H. Longfield, President and
Chief Operating Officer of C.R. Bard, Inc., to Fellow Bard Shareholders (Oct. 18, 1993)
(on file with author). Bard's president ironically adds: "We are a company whose pri-
mary concern is the quality and integrity of our products and the welfare of patients." Id.
The FDA Commissioner, David A. Kessler, also commented on the severity of the
crimes: "For a company to engage in a pattern of using unsuspecting patients as guinea
pigs and operating rooms as laboratories for unapproved products, shows a blatant dis-
regard for the health and safety of the patients who literally entrusted their lives to the
company's products." U.S. DEP'T JUST., 5 FOOD & DRUG REP. 191, 191 (1994)
(statement of David A. Kessler on October 15, 1993).
125. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 291, 294. The Boston Globe reported the fine
as "the largest fine in history for violations of FDA rules." Zuckoff, supra note 72, at
19. The court emphasized "that [t]his [was] a case in which a pervasive and powerful
corporate culture exalted the value of profit above the value of human life." C.R. Bard,
Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 291. Noting that greed was the obvious motive for Bard's illegal
conduct, the court believed a substantial financial penalty was appropriate. Id. As a re-
sult of this greed, Bard's conduct caused the company to post a $25.2 million loss in the
third quarter of 1994. Jeffrey Krasner, Fine Flattens Bard Earnings, BOSTON HERALD,
Oct. 20, 1993, at 32. In addition, the district court also required Bard to provide notice
to possible victims to allow them to decide if they wished to assert a claim against Bard
in civil litigation. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 293.
The U.S. Attorney also recognized that "in their effort to maximize profits, [Bard and
its top officers] ignored the laws that protect the health and safety of all patients in the
United States." U.S. DEP'TJUST., 5 FOOD & DRUG REP. 191, 191 (1994) (statement of A.
John Pappalardo on October 15, 1993).
126. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 292. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)-(b) (1994)
(stating that a court may order that a defendant make restitution to a victim under certain
circumstances). See also C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 292-93 (noting the court could
compensate victims only for their medical expenses and lost earnings).
127. C.R. Bard, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 293. The court noted that civil suits are the
best vehicle to address restitution because they may include "damages for pain and suffer-
ing or punitive damages." Id. This language shows the court's anticipation that Bard
would be properly subjected to civil claims. Reply Brief of the Appellants at 3, Talbott
II, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951). But see Talbott 1, 865 F. Supp. at 48 (stating that "[tihe
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After learning of the criminal proceedings, the plaintiffs in Talbott
filed a civil suit, asserting twenty state claims against Bard.' 28  The
plaintiffs sought both compensatory and punitive damages. 29 The
district court, however, relying on previous First Circuit decisions,
dismissed the case, ruling that section 360k(a) of the MDA preempted
each of the plaintiffs' claims. 30 On appeal, the First Circuit relied on
its previous decision in King v. Collagen Corp.,'3 ' and affirmed the
district court's decision that section 360k(a) of the MDA preempted all
of the plaintiffs' claims.. 3
2
In King, the First Circuit became the first federal appellate court to
decide that the MDA preempted all state tort claims based on "an injury
caused by a Class III medical device."'' 33 The King court, looking first
to the plain language of the MDA, found that section 360k(a) expressly
prohibits states from establishing requirements for medical devices that
differ from, or add to, any of the MDA's requirements, unless ex-
court now realizes that its analysis was mistaken to the extent that it did not . . recog-
nize that victims' rights to assert civil claims concerning Bard's heart catheters are pre-
empted by the MDA").
128. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating the claims against Bard).
129. The plaintiffs' action "[wias based entirely on state common and statutory
law[s] of general applicability." See Brief of the Appellants at 3, Talbott i, 63 F.3d 25
(1st Cir. 1995) (No. 94-1951) (citing the court's Order of Dismissal).
130. Talbott 1, 865 F. Supp. at 40. The district court explained that the Bard catheter
was subject to comprehensive FDA regulation, and no private right of action existed to
enforce the FDA's standards. Id. at 45-46 (listing cases stating that no private cause of
action exists). The court also noted that because permitting litigation of any state
claims would create the risk that Bard would be subject to requirements divergent from, or
in addition to, the FDA requirements, the MDA preempted all claims. Id. at 44-45.
While noting that the plaintiffs had "undoubtedly suffered" damages, the district court
concluded that preemption "represents a permissible decision by Congress that the pub-
lic interest will best be served by relying exclusively on the FDA to strike the proper
balance between reasonably assuring safety and promoting innovation with regard to
new devices that have the potential both to enhance and to injure human health." Id. at
40.
131. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993). For an expansive
discussion of King, see Kronenberg, supra note 37, at 578-87.
132. Talbott I1, 63 F.3d at 31.
133. Kronenberg, supra note 37, at 569, 578 (citing Panel Bars Product Liability
Suit, Bus. INS., Jan. 25, 1993, at 70). The King decision essentially ensures that a man-
ufacturer will not be held liable under "any state common law" theories for injuries
caused by a Class III medical device once the FDA has approved that device. Id. at 569.
Kronenberg concludes that this procedure gives to Class III medical device manufacturers
a "government insurance policy" because once a "medical device is approved, plaintiffs'
state tort law claims are preempted." Id. at 587. See also King, 983 F.2d at 1135-37. In
King, the plaintiff used a Collagen cosmetic device intended to smooth existing wrin-
kles. Id. at 1131-32. The device instead caused a debilitating auto-immune disease. id.
at 1132.
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pressly exempted by the FDA under section 360k(b).' 34 The court
next reasoned that to avoid preemption, the subject matter regulated by
a state requirement must not relate to the safety or effectiveness of the
device or other matters included in the Act. 35 After examining the
plaintiff's claims, the court stressed that, if successful, the claims
would create state requirements 36 that differed from, or surpassed, the
FDA's regulations concerning the safety and effectiveness of the de-
vice at issue.
37
Applying reasoning similar to that found in King, the Talbott court
first determined that state tort law fell within section 360k(a) because it
imposed "requirements."'' 38 The court recognized that the district court
1 34. Id. at 1134-35. The First Circuit heeded Cipollone's careful construction of the
preemption provision to ensure that it would "extend no further than its language war-
ranted." Id. at 1134 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992)
(plurality opinion)). Thus, the court recognized that "Congress' enactment of a provi-
sion defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are
not preempted." Id. at 1133 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion)).
135. Id. at 1134.
136. The King court stated that it used the FDA's interpretation of a "state require-
ment" for guidance. Id. The court interpreted § 360k(a)'s meaning of "state requirement"
as emanating "from any requirement established by a state including statutes, regula-
tions, court decisions or ordinances." Id. As a result, the court claimed that the FDA's
view did include court decisions resulting from state law tort claims brought against med-
ical device manufacturers. See id. at 1134-37.
137. Id. at 1135-37. Many courts have acknowledged the King decision as the lead-
ing case in the MDA preemption field and have chosen to follow its mandate of blanket
preemption. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals followed King in Stamps v. Collagen,
984 F.2d 1415 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993), finding all of the plain-
tiffs' state law claims preempted by federal law. Id. at 1418. The Stamps court also con-
cluded that § 360k(a) "sweeps broadly" and encompasses common law tort actions
within its preemptive scope if they are "different from, or in addition to" the federal law.
Id. at 1421 (quoting Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion)).
In a more recent case, the First Circuit applied the MDA provision to preempt common
law claims against a heart pacemaker manufacturer. Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d
13, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1994). Consistent with its decision in King, the First Circuit con-
cluded that "'[a]ny state requirement which ... establishe[d] a new substantive require-
ment for [a] device in a regulated area ... [was] preempted."' Id. at 19 (quoting King,
983 F.3d at 1134-35). Applying King, the court determined that the plaintiffs' claims
would indeed impose additional requirements and procedures upon manufacturers beyond
those of "good manufacturing practices" mandated by the FDCA and MDA. Mendes, 18
F.3d at 19. Under these conditions, plaintiffs' claims would be preempted. Id.
The Mendes decision, however, left open various issues in the First Circuit. Unlike
King, the device at issue in Mendes, a pacemaker, had been marketed without premarket
approval because no regulation specifically required a PMA, and because the FDA found
the pacemaker to be substantially equivalent to pre-MDA pacemakers. Id. at 17-18. In
addition, the Mendes court carefully limited its holding to the facts and claims of the
case before it and expressly declined to decide whether claims based on a company's fail-
ure to adhere to FDA regulations would be preempted. Id. at 19-20.
138. Talbott Ii, 63 F.3d at 27. The court explained that the plaintiffs' reading of
"requirement" to only include state statutes and regulations, and not common law causes
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had thoroughly analyzed each of the plaintiffs' claims. 3 9 The First
Circuit, therefore, adopted those particular portions of the district
court's decision"4 and found preemption, because each of the claims
imposed additional requirements.' 4'
The Talbott court then focused its attention on the plaintiffs' argu-
ment that section 360k(a) should not preempt state claims in cases
where the manufacturer submits fraudulent information to the FDA.
42
The court determined that neither the language of the statute, nor its
legislative history, supported the notion that Congress intended to
provide an exception to the MDA's preemption provision. 43 The
court also opined that allowing such an exception would disrupt the
delicate balance between the contradictory goals of the MDA.'" The
court noted that Congress enacted the MDA to protect consumers from
dangerous medical devices, while at the same time, encouraging inno-
vation by subjecting manufacturers to uniform nationwide stan-
dards. 45 The court concluded by adding that injured consumers could
of action, had already been dismissed by the circuit in King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36, and in
Mendes, 18 F.3d at 16. Id. The Talbott II court also reasoned that Congress understood
state tort law as imposing a "requirement" which, if "different from, or in addition to"
the MDA's requirement, would preempt the state tort law. Id. The court proposed that
every other circuit considering the issue had adopted a similar construction. Id. at 27
n. I.
139. Id. at 31.
140. The court agreed with the district court's analysis and found it unnecessary to re-
peat the analysis again because it acknowledged that if a district judge generates a "well-
reasoned opinion that reaches the correct result, a reviewing court should not write" a
lengthy opinion just to "put matters in its own words." Id. (citing In re San Juan Dupont
Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993)).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 27-30. Because of the prior criminal proceedings, the court assumed that
Bard fraudulently obtained FDA approval. Id. at 28.
The court recognized that this exception-for-noncompliance argument may be an open
issue in the circuit. Id. First, the court pointed to the fact that the King decision did not
address this question for the entire court. Id. Only in what was titled a concurring opin-
ion did the panel state that there was no exception to preemption under the MDA where a
manufacturer failed to comply with the FDA. Id. In addition, the Mendes court explicitly
declined to address this point. Mendes, 18 F.3d at 19-20; see supra note 137. Thus, be-
cause of the uncertainty in its own precedents, the Talbott 1 court decided to address the
issue anew. Talbott II, 63 F.3d at 28.
143. Id. at 30. If it did, the court noted, Congress would have clearly said so. Id.
144. Id. at 29. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
145. Talbott 11, 63 F.3d at 29. Under this scheme, the court suggested that a manufac-
turer could be subjected to inconsistent interpretations and applications of the MDA in
various states. Id. This would destroy the MDA's goal of uniformity. Id. To avoid non-
uniform treatment, Congress authorized the FDA to enforce the MDA. Id. With its ex-
pertise, the FDA could best determine when the MDA had been violated and ensure its
uniform application. Id. at 30 (citing Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1329 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995)). See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text
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still obtain compensation through restitution in a criminal action against
the manufacturer, and therefore would not be completely remedi-
less. 14 6
B. The "Middle of the Road" Rulings on Preemption: Finding the
MDA to Preempt Some, But Not All, State Claims
Recently, several circuits have declined to apply blanket preemption
to state tort claims concerning Class III devices under the Medical De-
vice Amendments.'47 Instead, these courts apply a different interpre-
tation of the MDA to a plaintiff's state tort claims and find that only
some, not all, claims are preempted. 48 In Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,
149
for a discussion of the two competing goals of the MDA.
146. This reasoning relies on the assumption that a criminal action will in fact be
brought.
In addition, the Talbott 1 court conceded that its decision may cause some to question
whether "complete preemption of private rights of action is the most fair and effective
means" of realizing the purpose of the MDA. Talbott ll, 63 F.3d at 31 (quoting Talbott
1, 865 F. Supp. at 40). Nonetheless, the court found that the congressional intent to
preempt was so clearly expressed in the statute that it overrode such concerns. Id.
147. See, e.g., Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that the MDA preempted two of the plaintiff's claims, but did not preempt two
others), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431, 436
(5th Cir. 1995) (allowing a plaintiff to assert design defect claims against manufacturers
of penile prostheses, while disallowing marketing defect, manufacturing defect, and in-
adequate warning claims); Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d at 1319 (contemplating that injured per-
sons would be able to pursue claims for economic loss such as express warranty and fraud
in advertising, while negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and fraud-
perpetrated-on-the-FDA claims were preempted); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d
1268, 1278-86 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that an express warranty claim, if properly es-
tablished, would not be preempted, while implied warranty, mislabeling, and fraud
claims would be preempted).
148. One of the first cases to establish partial preemption under the MDA was
Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1994). For the
non-preempted claims, the Shiley court stressed that it could not agree with the existing
authority because the decisions departed from the controlling law and clear expression of
the Supreme Court in Cipollone. Id. at 1439-40.
Focusing heavily on the presumption against preemption, the Shiley court supported
its conclusion that the MDA did not completely preempt state tort claims by noting the
FDA's non-preemption decree as embodied in its regulations. Id. at 1440. The court
stated that the FDA regulations are of key importance because they discuss "the meaning
of 'requirement' and the effect of the legislation on tort law." Id. at 1435. The court also
explained that the MDA's legislative history established "an intent to protect con-
sumers from medical device injuries." Id. at 1440. Furthermore, the court looked for
guidance from the Supreme Court in Cipollone. Id. at 1436. The Shiley court also cited
the lack of any clear statement in the statute itself creating blanket preemption. Id. at
1440. Significantly, the court explained that if Congress intended to destroy an entire
body of state consumer protection laws, leaving the victims no opportunity for relief, it
would have specifically stated so. Id.
149. 56 F.3d 1335 (1Ilth Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996).
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for instance, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that federal law preempted
two state tort claims, but did not preempt the other two state claims. 5 °
In Lohr, the plaintiff received an implant of a pacemaker manufac-
tured by Medtronic, Inc. 5 ' Three years later, the pacemaker failed,
and the plaintiff was forced to undergo emergency surgery because of
a defective component in the Class Ill device. 52 In contrast to Talbott,
however, the Lohr court was presented with a device that reached the
market without first undergoing premarket approval.'5' The FDA had
determined that the device was substantially equivalent to an earlier-
marketed device, and therefore allowed the manufacturer to sell the
pacemaker without going through the PMA process." 4
The Lohr court began its opinion by acknowledging the MDA's two
competing objectives of public safety and continued development of
medical devices. 55  The court questioned, however, whether
Congress intended to achieve these objectives by preempting state law
claims. 56 In order to answer this question, the court examined
whether the phrase "state requirement" in the preemption provision of
the MDA' 7 encompassed some state tort claims, and concluded that it
did.' 58 The court suggested, however, that the statute's savings
clause 59 disallowed a finding "that the MDA preempt[ed] all state lawliability. "160
150. Id. at 1352. In their complaint, the plaintiff and her husband alleged claims of
negligent design, negligent manufacture, negligent failure-to-warn, and strict liability
in tort. Id. at 1340.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
manufacturers must obtain such approval before selling a Class III medical device.
154. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1340. Because the FDA determined that the device had the same
intended use as a previously-approved device and possessed the same technological
characteristics or was as safe and effective as the earlier device, the lead component qual-
ified as a substantially-equivalent device. Id. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the "substantially equivalent" method of obtaining FDA permis-
sion to sell a Class III medical device.
155. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1339. The court stated, however, that "[c]ourts must be mindful
of the fact that legislative acts reflect many competing interests and should not allow
vague notions about a statute's overall purpose to overcome its plain text." Id. at 1339
n.1 (citing Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 113 S. Ct. 2063, 2071 (1993)).
156. Id. at 1341-42.
157. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). See supra part ll.B.4 for a discussion of the MDA
preemption provision.
158. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1342. The court concluded that this was the law of the Eleventh
Circuit. Id.
159. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(d) (1994). See supra note 93 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the savings clause.
160. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1342. In addition, the court pointed to the notion that the
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The Lohr court more closely examined the term "requirement" to
determine which state claims were allowed by the MDA under the
savings clause.' 6' Finding Congress' use of the word "requirement" in
section 360k(a) ambiguous, the court studied the FDA's interpretations
of the MDA in section 808.1(d) of the regulations. 62 The court ex-
plained that the Supreme Court in Cipollone did not forbid a court
from relying on the guidance offered by the FDA's regulations. 63 In
fact, in previous decisions, the Supreme Court had also given defer-
ence to FDA preemption regulations."6 Moreover, the Lohr court in-
terpreted section 808.1 (d) to properly narrow the meaning of "require-
ments" to "specific requirements," and therefore gave the regulation
deference in its interpretation of the preemptive scope of the MDA.1
65
The court next determined the meaning of "specific requirements,"
and found that the plain language of section 808. 1(d) did not mandate
that requirements be device-specific." 6 To the contrary, the court in-
terpreted the regulation as dictating that the requirement be limited to a
particular process, procedure, or device.167
The Lohr court applied these preemption principles to each of the
state claims brought by the plaintiffs to determine whether the MDA
preempted any, or all, of the claims. 68 First, the court held that the
MDA did not preempt the claim of negligent design because neither the
statute, nor applicable regulations, "establish[ed] any specific design
MDA's savings clause did not explicitly-say that tort liability, as opposed to contract
liability, for example, must be maintained. Id. at 1342-43. Further, the court stated that
where Congress clearly expressed its intent to preempt, a non-exclusive savings clause
could not replace a "specific preemption provision." Id. at 1343 (citing Morales v.
Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1992)). "[Als long as [the court in-
terpreted] § 360k(a) as permitting some state law liability, the MDA's savings clause
simply begs the questions of what liability it preserves." Id.
161. Id. at 1343-46.
162. Id. at 1344. See supra note 97 for an explanation of 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(1)
(1995).
163. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1343-44.
164. Id. at 1344 (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 712-14 (1985)).
165. Id. at 1344-45. The court stated that to give "requirements" a narrow meaning
would avoid several problems that would ensue by literally reading § 360k(a): 1) a broad
reading of § 360k(a) would suggest that the MDA had an expansive preemptive scope
even though this construction was not favored; 2) a broad reading would give no effect to
§ 360h(d) because it would "call into question almost all state tort liability" relating to
manufacturers regulated by the MDA; and 3) the MDA's legislative history reveals that
Congress did not intend to completely preempt the field of medical device regulation.
Id.
166. Id. at 1345.
167. Id. at 1346.
168. Id. at 1347.
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requirements... which conflict[ed] with the state law claim.' 169 The
court found significant the fact that the FDA never approved the design
of the device at issue, but simply allowed the manufacturer to sell the
device because it was substantially equivalent to other devices already
on the market.170 Thus, the court concluded that a state court determi-
nation that the device was negligently designed would not conflict with
any federal requirements pertaining to the device's design.' 7' In addi-
tion, the court found, for similar reasons, that the MDA did not pre-
empt the strict liability claim because the substantially equivalent notifi-
cation process did not prevent the creation of an "unreasonably dan-
gerous product.''17
The Lohr court concluded, however, that the MDA preempted the
negligent manufacturing and failure-to-warn claims. 73 The court de-
termined that the MDA regulated manufacturing practices and imposed
specific labeling requirements. 74 The court determined that these
regulations constituted specific requirements which were "different
from or in addition to" the two state claims, and therefore found the
claims preempted under the MDA. 175
C. No Preemption of State Tort Claims Under the MDA
Departing from the established authority of King77 and those courts
169. Id. at 1349.
170. Id. at 1348. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text for a detailed expla-
nation of how devices can reach the market through the "substantial equivalence" proce-
dure.
171. Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1349.
172. Id. at 1352.
173. Id. at 1350-51.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Commentators have heavily criticized King. See, e.g., Kronenberg, supra note
37, at 565 (arguing that the King holding "effectively allows manufacturers to be insu-
lated against state common law claims" and "injured plaintiffs are left without an ade-
quate remedy"); Sunshine, supra note 84, at 192, 211 (suggesting that the King decision
extends the scope of the MDA beyond both its preemption provision and the intent of
Congress and will thus "have a dramatic impact on the medical device industry"); Truitt,
supra note 35, at 178 (stressing that the King decision could place severe limitations on
plaintiffs' right to sue if they are harmed by negligently-designed medical devices be-
cause they "cannot sue the FDA for improper approval methods" due to the FDA's gov-
ernmental immunity).
In a case similar to King, a heart valve manufacturer (Shiley, Inc.) offered a $500 mil-
lion settlement "to injured recipients of its FDA-approved devices." Kronenberg, supra
note 37, at 586 (citing Linda Himelstein, An Invincible Shield for Medical
Manufacturers, Bus. WK., Aug. 9, 1993, at 73). Had King already been decided, the
chance of settlement may have been unlikely, and the injured persons would not have re-
ceived any recompense. Id. Interestingly, Shiley defended its actions with the King
preemption theory in another case in which 300 heart valve recipients sued for damages.
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favoring total preemption, more courts are taking the approach that
none of a plaintiff's state tort claims are preempted by the MDA.'77
Just as one court has acknowledged the fact that not in one place do the
words "common law" appear in section 360k of the MDA,'78 many
courts utilize the plain language of the statute to show that Congress
did not intend the word "requirement" to include state common law. 179
Additionally, the courts favoring allowance of plaintiff's claims rely on
the legislative history of the MDA to support these contentions. 80 Fi-
Id. Some predicted that if the court in that case followed King, the 300 plaintiffs would
be remediless, and "the legal and economic impact" on future court decisions would be
"staggering." Id.
1 77. Although these courts are smaller in number and many of the decisions remain at
the district or lower state court levels, their decisions continue to gain greater recogni-
tion and voice because they persuasively refuse to adhere to blanket preemption. See,
e.g., Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 905, 907 (D. Colo. 1994) (finding that the
MDA did not preempt a products liability claim under state law for an allegedly defective
hip replacement device); Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D. Ohio
1994) (holding that the MDA did not preempt the strict liability, negligence, and breach
of implied warranty claims of a user of a prosthetic knee device); Desmarais v. Dow
Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. Conn. 1989) (concluding that the MDA did not
preempt the state-based claim of failure-to-warn in regard to breast implants); Callan v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Md. 1989) (holding that a plaintiff's state
tort claims were not preempted as a result of her injuries sustained due to use of an in-
trauterine device); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn.
1988) (concluding that the state law products liability claim of an intrauterine device
user was not preempted by the MDA); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273,
1282 (Haw. 1992) (concluding that an implied warranty claim for injuries caused by de-
fective pacemaker was not preempted by the MDA); Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642
N.E.2d 206, 207 (!11. App. Ct. 1994) (ruling that the MDA did not preempt a common
law products liability claim against a knee implant manufacturer), aff'd, 2 Prod. Liab.
Rep. (CCH) 14,513 (111. Jan. 18, 1996); Fogal v. Steinfeld, 620 N.Y.S.2d 875, 883
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994) (holding that the defective design, breach of warranty, and failure-
to-warn claims against a pacemaker manufacturer were not preempted).
178. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 667.
179. See, e.g., Mulligan, 850 F. Supp. at 636 (concluding that Congress has not in-
dicated an "unambiguous intent" to preempt plaintiff's state tort claims); Haudrich, 642
N.E.2d at 210 (suggesting that "Congress' use of the term 'requirement"' meant a re-
quirement imposed by statutory authority and not by case law). The courts examined sec-
tions of the MDA which go beyond those of the general rule in §§ 360k(a) and (b), as in
§ 360h(d). Mulligan, 850 F. Supp. at 636. Interpreting § 360h(d) to give effect to con-
gressional intent, the courts reiterated the fact that mere compliance with an FDA order
will not relieve a responsible party from liability under federal or state laws. Id.
(stressing that § 360h(d) "specifically contemplates" liability and damages arising un-
der state law).
180. Callan, 709 F. Supp. at 667 (explaining that the legislative history of the MDA
shows a lack of congressional intent to preempt state tort law). In the absence of a clear
statement of congressional intent, the courts recognize the strong, traditional presump-
tion against preemption in matters related to public health and safety. Desmarais, 712
F. Supp. at 16 (recognizing the presumption against preemption, especially in regard to
the health and safety concerns of the state). In addition, these courts acknowledge that
the legislative history emphasizes Congress' concern for ensuring consumer safety so
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nally, courts rely on the FDA's interpretation of the MDA to support
the conclusion that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort claims
when it enacted the MDA.181
In Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 82 the Ninth Circuit interpreted FDA
regulations as providing that no state common law claims should be
preempted. 83 In Kennedy, as in King v. Collagen Corp.,84 the
plaintiff alleged that she developed an autoimmune disease after treat-
ment with the Zyderm Collagen Implant, and sued on six separate
claims. 85 The district court found each claim preempted and granted
Collagen's motion for summary judgment. 86
On appeal, the Kennedy court rejected the district court's holding
that section 360k(a) of the MDA preempts all of a plaintiff's state tort
claims.187 After emphasizing the traditional presumption against pre-
emption,'88 the court stated that Congress failed to specify what consti-
tutes a "state requirement," as well as what constitutes a "requirement"
under the MDA. 89 The Kennedy court therefore examined the FDA's
that the plaintiffs may be ensured an opportunity for judicial recourse. Haudrich, 642
N.E.2d at 211 (noting that it would be unusual for Congress to destroy the "safety
aspects inherent in tort litigations" by eliminating tort actions with the exact statute
enacted to encourage greater protection of the public health). See also Desmarais, 712
F. Supp. at 16 (recognizing that the "primary purpose" of the MDA is to protect the pub-
lic from exposure to harmful devices).
181. See Elbert v. Howmedica, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 327, 331-32 (D. Haw. 1993)
(concluding that neither the MDA nor its underlying FDA regulations preempt state tort
claims). See also Oja, 848 F. Supp. at 906 n. I (acknowledging that the FDA regulations
impose limits on preemption).
182. 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
183. Id. at 1459-60. See infra notes 185-209 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Kennedy decision.
184. 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993). See supra notes
131-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of the King decision.
185. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1454. The claims included "negligence, strict liability,
breach of warranty, battery, conspiracy, and loss of consortium." Id.
The plaintiff suffered from Systemic Lupus Erythematosus, or SLE, "an autoimmune
disorder in which the body's immune system, for unknown reasons, attacks the connec-
tive tissue as though it were foreign, causing inflammation." THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
ASSOCIATION ENCYCLOPEDIA oF MEDICINE, supra note 1, at 653. "The more common type,
discoid lupus erythematosus (DLE), affects exposed areas of the skin." Id. "The more se-
rious and potentially fatal form (SLE) affects many systems of the body, including the
joints and the kidneys." Id.
186. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1455.
187. Id. at 1460.
188. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of this presump-
tion.
189. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1457.
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interpretation of the preemption provision to determine which state
claims were preempted by the MDA.' 9
The Kennedy court challenged the fact that some courts had read
.section 360k(a) to preempt state tort law,191 noting that a broad reading
of the provision recognizes that "any state law is, by definition, a law
.in addition to' federal law."' 92 Because this would render section
360k(a)'s "'different from' language meaningless," the court ap-
proached its reading of the MDA in a more restricted fashion. 19
3
The court also referred to the FDA's interpretations of section
360k(a).' 94 The Kennedy court gave deference to the FDA's position,
finding it controlling because it did not conflict with Congress' in-
tent.' 95 The court interpreted section 808.1(d)(1)196 as not allowing
preemption of laws of general applicability.'97 The court concluded
that state common law qualifies as a law of general applicability9" and
therefore "cannot qualify as a specific requirement [that] may be pre-
empted by the MDA."' 99 '
Even though the defendant had obtained FDA approval to market the
device through the PMA process, the Kennedy court found that that
process alone did not constitute a "specific requirement."2° The court
noted that to allow state claims to be preempted in cases where the de-
vice had been approved through the PMA process would prevent in-
jured plaintiffs from obtaining an adequate remedy. 20' This, the court
190. Id. at 1457-59. The court reiterated that Congress charged the FDA with imple-
menting the MDA. Id. Thus, the FDA's interpretation controls if it does not contravene
Congress' intent. Id. at 1459 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). If the FDA propounds a reasonable statutory
interpretation, the court cannot replace the FDA's interpretation with that of its own.
Id. at 1457 (citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. The Supreme Court has required such an approach. See Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518, 523 (1992) (acknowledging the "appropriateness of a
narrow reading" of the preemption provision at issue in the case).
194. See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995).
195. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459-60.
196. See supra note 97 for the full text of § 808.1(d)(I).
197. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1459.
198. Id. The Kennedy court established that while specific state common laws may
be responding "to a harm created by a particular device, state common law does not relate
solely to or regulate any particular device or product to the exclusion of other devices or
products." Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The court noted that merely because the PMA process involves specific re-
quirements, the PMA process itself does not necessarily act as a specific requirement. Id.
201. Id. Reading the MDA preemption provision in this way, as many courts have
done, leaves consumers of Class III devices without recourse for the harm they have suf-
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maintained, would subvert Congress' intent in enacting the MDA-to
protect consumers.20 2
The Kennedy court recognized that its holding conflicted with other
courts, which have concluded that the premarket approval process
constitutes a specific federal requirement for a device and preempts
state common law claims.2 3 Criticizing these decisions, the Kennedy
court observed that their reasoning stood "in sharp contrast to [their]
analys[es] of Class II devices. 20 4 In Class II cases, the courts
specifically focused on the federal requirements and the device's par-
ticularity.2 5 Yet, these, same courts ignored the word "particular" in
Class III preemption analyses and thus required less overall specificity
under section 808. l(d).206 The Kennedy court found that "[s]uch dis-
tinctions between Class II and Class III devices make little sense"2 7
because "Congress enacted the MDA to ensure that safe and effective
medical devices [entered] the market," regardless of their class.20 8
Thus, the Kennedy court departed from the majority rule, holding that
the MDA did not preempt any state common law claims.2°9
fered. Id.
202. Id. The court emphatically acknowledged that PMA must benefit consumers, not
"create a rose garden, free from liability, for manufacturers." Id. at 1460.
203. Id. at 1458. See, e.g., Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2614 (1995); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d
1416, 1421-22 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993).
204. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1458.
205. See, e.g., Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1989)
(refusing to preempt state laws relating to design claims because the only federal regula-
tions applying to the particular device were labeling and warning requirements). See
also Anguiano v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806, 810 (9th Cir. 1995)
(ruling that state law claims were not preempted "[b]ecause the FDA had not promulgated
specific regulations regarding" the device).
206. Kennedy, 67 F.3d at 1458.
207. Id. (footnote omitted).
208. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1090, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1103).
209. Id. at 1459 & n.2 One state supreme court also embodied this view that the
MDA protected, rather than completely preempted, the claims of a consumer injured by a
Class III medical device. Larsen v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1282 (Haw.
1992). Using reasoning similar to that of the Kennedy court, the Supreme Court of
Hawaii announced that § 360k(a) of the MDA and § 808.1(d) governed the scope of pre-
emption under the MDA, id. at 1281, and ruled that the MDA did not preempt a patient's
claims for breach of implied warranty. Id. at 1282. The court stated that if there are no
sufficiently specific FDA regulations pertaining to device design, state law claims of de-
fective design fall outside of the preemptive scope of § 808. 1(d). Id. (citing Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 867 F.2d at 247). Here, the court found no specific statutes or regulations
applicable to the device in question, so the claims were not preempted. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
Because of the well-established presumption against preemption in
areas historically controlled by the states,1 ° most courts hesitate to
apply preemption when Congress has not clearly indicated its intent to
do so. " Conversely, in the context of the MDA, "virtually all courts"
since King have concluded that common law is preempted.1 2 Despite
this strong precedent, several courts reviewing the question of pre-
emption under the MDA have broken free from a "follow-the-leader"
type mentality which may be ascribed to King,1 3 following instead the
view proposed by the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy.2 4  Embracing the
"'strong presumption' that the plain language of [a] statute expresses
congressional intent, 21 5 these courts have found that neither Congress
nor the FDA made clear-either expressly or impliedly-that they in-
tended to preempt all state tort claims asserted by plaintiffs.1 6 Thus,
as shown by the absence of any dispositive language in the text of the
MDA;217 by the emphasis Congress placed on safety, not the preemp-
tion of claims, in the legislative history of the MDA; 218 in the FDA's
2 10. See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
211. See United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64
(1954) (noting that the Court will not deprive an injured person from a "right of recov-
ery" where "Congress has neither provided nor suggested any substitute for the tradi-
tional state court procedure for collecting damages for injuries caused by tortious con-
duct").
212. Sunshine, supra note 84, at 197 (listing cases supporting this proposition).
213. For example, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals followed the King decision
within just one month of its ruling and found all of the plaintiff's state law claims pre-
empted by federal law. Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1418 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993). Additionally, counsel in Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67
F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995), stated that all of the decisions after King "were like the em-
peror's new clothes; other courts followed suit." MDA Preemption: CA 9 Rejects
Device Rulings, Says Federal Law Does Not Bar State Claims, Health Law Rep. (BNA)
No. 42, at 1608 (Oct. 26, 1995).
214. See supra note 177 for a listing of such cases.
215. Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 135 (1991)
(citing Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
216. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(concluding that Congress has not "manifested an unambiguous intent to preempt" the
plaintiff's state tort claims by "express terms [or] by implication"). See also Elbert v.
Howmedica, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 327, 331-32 (D. Haw. 1993) (holding that the MDA and
FDA regulations fail to preempt state tort claims).
217. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, conclude that "nowhere in the amendments [of the
MDA] or in the legislative history of the amendments does Congress indicate that state
common law tort claims are preempted." Id. at 923-24. Yet, for "express preemption to
occur, Congress must explicitly declare that the state law on a certain subject is pre-
empted." Jortberg, supra note 42, at 990. Lacking specificity, the language of the ex-
press MDA preemption provision disallows blanket preemption. Id.
218. See 121 CONG. REC. 10,688 (1975); see supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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controlling interpretation of the statute; 9 and for public policy rea-
sons,2 20 only one conclusion should prevail: Congress did not intend
to preempt state common law claims.
A. The Plain Language of the MDA Fails to Support a Finding of
Total Preemption
To resolve the conflicting interpretations of what Congress intended
in enacting the MDA, one must begin by examining the language of the
statute itself 2  For, if the statute says "anything" about preemption, it
should say "everything. 222
1. Congress Did Not Intend To Equate Section 360k's Use of
"Requirement" With State Tort Law
Much of the interpretation and meaning of the MDA revolves around
one word: "requirement., 223 The plain text of section 360k suggests
219. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 74 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(acknowledging that "'after a statute has been construed ... by a consistent course of de-
cision[s] by other federal ... agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if
the judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."') (quoting Shearson/Ameri-
can Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)). See also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 463 U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the regulations
which serve as the "construction of a statute by [a federal agency] charged with setting
the law in motion . . . deserve substantial respect in determining the meaning of [the
statute]") (citations omitted).
220. United States v. Key, 397 U.S. 322, 324 (1970) (suggesting that a statute must
be construed to give effect to its underlying public policy).
221. United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc. , 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). See also
Reiter v. Zimmer, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 199, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that one must
begin any attempt to discover Congress' intent in enacting the MDA by looking at the
statute itself); Guertin v. Dixon, 864 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993)
(suggesting that to determine statutory intent, courts must consider the statute's con-
text, language, and subject matter); Buttelo v. S.A. Woods-Yates American Mach. Co.,
864 P.2d 948, 950 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that courts may use tools of statutory
construction to uncover congressional meaning); Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 899
n.134 (stating that the basic rule for interpreting statutes involves reading the statute to
further the legislature's intent).
222. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 548 (1992) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Scalia interpreted the rule newly pro-
pounded by the Court to require that "[tihe statute that . . . says anything about pre-
emption must say everything; and it must do so with great exactitude, as any ambiguity
concerning its scope will be read in favor of preserving state power." Id. (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). While such a rule could be practically applied
to the MDA to give' effect to the statute's meaning and purpose, Justice Scalia admon-
ished that if this is a true statement of the law, few "congresses will dare to say anything
about pre[]emption." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. Brief of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Appellants at 4, Talbott H, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951) [hereinafter Trial
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the meaning Congress intended to attach to "requirement" in this stat-
ute. Examining the word in section 360k(a) alone reveals that Con-
gress used "requirement" three times.224 Section 360k(a)(1)'s phrase,
"any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device," and sec-
tion 360k(a)(2)'s phrase, "a requirement applicable to the device under
this Act," refer only to the FDA's imposition of "positive enactments"
or "legislative type rules," not common law actions.225 Section
360k(a)'s initial use of the word "requirement" comes before subsec-
tion (a)(1). 226 Some courts interpret this term to include common law
actions. 27 To reach that result, however, Congress would have had to
intend "requirement" to be read one way before sections 360k(a)(1)
and (2) and another way where it appears for a second and third time
immediately thereafter.228 Such a determination challenges the canon
of statutory construction that when a term appears in various places
throughout a statute, it usually embraces the same meaning each time it
appears.229
Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief]. A "requirement" is "something that is wanted or needed,"
or "something that is called for or demanded." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1929 (3d ed. 1986). As a result, some suggest that the term denotes
"specific actions mandated or disallowed" by a governing body. Adler & Mann, supra
note 42, at 935 n.66. Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary defines "require" as "asking
for authoritatively or imperatively." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (6th ed. 1990).
224. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
225. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 926 (citing § 360k(a)) (emphasis added). In ad-
dition, the MDA does not authorize the FDA to impose requirements through common
law actions. Id.
226. § 360k(a) provides that "no State . . . may establish or continue in effect . . .
any requirement." Id. at 938 (emphasis added).
227. See Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1323 & n.4 (3d Cir.) (stating that
"the term 'requirements' as used in § 360k encompasses state common law claims"),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995).
228. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 926; Appellant's Reply Brief at 13, Talbott H,
63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951).
229. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 926. See also Ratzlaff v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 655, 660 (1994) (establishing that a term in a statute is "generally read the same way
each time it appears"); State v. Bea, 864 P.2d 854 (Or. 1993) (contending that if the leg-
islature uses the same term throughout a statute, a court must infer the same meaning
throughout as well); Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 928 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360j(a)
(Supp. 1994) as an example supporting the proposition that whenever "requirement" is
used in other places in the MDA, it seems evident that congressional intent was to "refer
only to legislative-type obligations promulgated by the FDA").
Other reasons may explain the use of "requirement" in the MDA. Congress used the
term to "generically cover" concepts such as "performance standards," (21 U.S.C. §
360c(a)(1)(B) (Supp. 1994)), and "premarket approval," (21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(c) and
360e (Supp. 1994)), to avoid having to constantly list the terms at each use. Id. at 936.
See also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 366-67 (1984) (drawing the distinction that while administrative regulations
are prospectively designed, common law liability is retrospectively designed). Under
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Further, as explained by one state appellate court,230 Congress re-
peatedly used the word "requirement" in sections 360k(a) and (b) to
refer to actions taken by Congress, the FDA, or state and political
subdivisions. 23' Any action by Congress or the FDA would necessar-
ily exist in the form of statutes or regulations because neither can ad-
judicate. 2  Thus, Congress' use of the term "requirements" to de-
scribe actions taken by it, the FDA, and states and political divisions
suggests that only a legislative or regulatory agency will impose a
"requirement" in the state or political subdivision context.233 Under
this interpretation, "requirement" fails to define court-imposed law.234
The phrase, "establish or continue in effect ... any requirement, ' 235
also suggests that Congress intended to refer to statutes or regula-
tions.z36 While these two types of laws may be established or contin-
ued in effect, case law can only be "handed down, developed, or de-
creed. 237
If Congress wished to eliminate the rights of potential victims to
seek redress under state tort law, it would have accomplished this goal
by using language that clearly elicited this intent, rather than by using
an obscure term such as "requirement. '2 38 As a result, the MDA must
Shavell's interpretation, it is therefore difficult to imagine the word "requirement" as
embodying both meanings.
230. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 210-11 (I11. App. Ct. 1994),
aff'd, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 9 14,513 (I11. Jan. 18, 1996). Although the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, it did so on the ground that the de-
fendant had waived the issue of preemption under the MDA because it failed to raise it in
the trial court. Haudrich, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 14, 513, at 47,449. Thus, the court
"save[d] for another day the question of whether the [MDA and § 360k] preempt the sort
of State-law tort claims" the plaintiff had raised. Id. Although the appellate court
decision in Haudrich may not be controlling, its rationale should be followed because by
giving effect to the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and the FDA's
regulations, it closely adheres to the effect Congress intended in not preempting
common law tort actions when it passed the MDA.
231. Haudrich, 642 N.E.2d at 210.
232. Id. The court states the obvious: "Congress legislates; the FDA regulates; but
neither Congress nor the FDA can adjudicate." Id.
233. Id. at 210-11.
234. Id.
235. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
236. Appellant's Reply Brief at 16, Talbott 1, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951); see also
Haudrich, 642 N.E.2d at 210 (suggesting that "Congress intended 'requirement' to refer
to statutes, ordinances, or regulations, all of which can be established or continued in
effect").
237. Appellant's Reply Brief at 16, Talbott II (No. 94-1951) (quoting Haudrich, 642
N.E.2d at 210).
238. Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 223, at 8. See, e.g., Taylor v.
General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 824 (lth Cir. 1989) (contending that "Congress
has long demonstrated an aptitude for expressly barring common law actions when it so
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be read to preempt state regulations or statutes regulating medical de-
vices, not state common law. 9
2. Section 360k(a), Together With Section 360k(b), Forecloses
Complete State Law Preemption
In a preemption analysis, courts consider not only the plain meaning
of the words of a statute, but also their location and purpose through-
out the statute.24° Thus, the terms of section 360k(a) may be read as
"requiring reference to the rest of the MDA and applicable FDA regu-
lations.' ' 24' "When Section 360k(a) is read in conjunction with Section
360k(b)," as the Supreme Court has suggested, the result indicates that
Congress did not intend total preemption of state common law
claims.242 Comparing the first sentence of section 360k(a) ("no State
or political subdivision of a State may establish ... any requirement")
with the first sentence of section 360k(b) ("[u]pon application of a
desires") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990). Instead, because the
statute and legislative history do not mention preemption of state common law claims,
one must pay heed to "the simplest and most obvious explanation for the statutory
silence that Congress never intended to displace state common law damage claims."
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 543 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). In addition, "if Congress had intended to preempt some
common law claims and not to preempt others, it would have made far greater sense to
state precisely which claims were to be displaced and which were to be left alone." Adler
& Mann, supra note 42, at 909. Because Congress has not done so, it has created a
"crazy quilt of preemption [of] common law claims." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 542-43
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
239. See Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 909. The court in King v. Collagen Corp.,
938 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993), failed to discuss whether Congress intended its use of
"state requirement" in the MDA to include state common law. Kronenberg, supra note
37, at 579. In this respect, it has been stated that the King court's analysis is "flawed"
in its preemption of all state tort claims. See id.
240. Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995) (stating that the Court con-
siders the "placement and purpose (of a word] in the statutory scheme" because the
"'meaning of statutory language ... depends on context"') (quoting Brown v. Gardner,
115 S. Ct. 552, 555 (1994)).
241. Appellant's Brief at 25, Talbott 11, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951). The appellants
cited to Little People's School, Inc. v. United States, 842 F.2d 570, 573 (lst Cir. 1988),
for the proposition that courts "must always interpret a statutory provision with refer-
ence to its context within the statute itself which necessitates consideration of the
statute in its entirety, deriving the meaning of a part from the whole of the words and
phrases that the legislature declared to be law." Id. at 24. Contra Cipollone, 505 U.S. at
517 (stating that if the language of a preemption clause suffices to establish congres-
sional intent, a court need not look to the "'substantive provisions' of the legislation")
(quoting California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987)
(plurality opinion)).
242. Appellant's Reply Brief at 14, Talbott 11 (No. 94-1951). See United States v.
Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 823 (1984) (recognizing that in order not to construe statutory
phrases in isolation, the Court reads statutes as a whole, and the words "must be read in
light of the immediately following phrase").
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State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary may... exempt.
•. any requirement") leads to this conclusion.243 The phrase "State or
political subdivision" appears in both sections, "but the action con-
templated (i.e., applying for an exemption) effectively excludes
courts."2 " While courts arguably fall within section 360k(a) because
they possess the ability to establish requirements through damage
awards,245 they have never been held to possess the means to apply for
an exemption under section 360k(b).2 6 Because Congress did not
give courts this ability, Congress must not have intended for courts to
fall within section 360k(b)'s definition of "[s]tate or a political subdi-
vision," and courts thus fail to be potential sources of preempted
"requirements., 247
243. Appellant's Reply Brief at 15, Talbott i (No. 94-1951). See also Haudrich, 642
N.E.2d at 209-10 (comparing the opening sentences of §§ 360(a) and (b)).
244. Appellant's Reply Brief at 15, Talbott H (No. 94-1951) (citing Haudrich, 642
N.E.2d at 209).
245. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959).
246. Haudrich, 642 N.E.2d at 209-10. As one court suggested, "if the term
'requirement' were interpreted so as to include tort law, the exemption procedures would
be rendered absurd; is the State supposed to petition the Secretary of Health [and Human
Services] . . .after every verdict in favor of... [a] plaintiff?" Callan v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 709 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D. Md. 1989). See also Appellant's Brief at 25, Talbott I1
(No. 94-1951) (suggesting that Congress failed to contemplate "the state's governor
petitioning the Secretary of Health and Human Services for an exemption following
every verdict in favor of a tort plaintiff or prior to the initiation of every state law suit").
247. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(b) (1994). The Cipollone Court concluded that the term
"requirement" includes state common law claims which may be preempted. Cipollone,
505 U.S. at 521-22 (plurality opinion). Cipollone, however, is not controlling in cases
dealing with the MDA. The language and substance of the MDA differs completely from
that of the 1965 and 1969 statutes in Cipollone. Compare § 360k(a) with the 1965 and
1969 Acts, which are discussed in detail at supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
The two diverse sets of statutes are applied in two different contexts to reach two differ-
ent conclusions. As Cipollone suggests, the express language of a particular statute
governs its pre-emptive scope, not the language of a different statute that simply hap-
pens to use the same word. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517. Adler and Mann effectively ar-
gue the point that merely because Congress used the term, "requirement," does not imply
that each time this term appears in a federal law that state tort law will necessarily be
preempted. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 918. Statutory interpretations require
more. The exact words of the statute used and the context in which they are used must be
scrutinized; the statute's purpose must be uncovered; and legislative histories and avail-
able regulations must be examined. Id. Thus, courts finding preemption of state tort
claims seem to apply the Cipollone meaning of "requirements" incorrectly to that of the
MDA.
In addition, Congress could not have known when it enacted the MDA that 16 years
later in Cipollone, the Supreme Court would construe "requirement" to include state tort
claims. Id. Yet, under interpretations such as those observed by the First Circuit in
Talbott II, Congress had to have known this in order to support a finding of blanket pre-
emption of tort claims. Id. Logically, the clear expression by the Supreme Court of its
presumption against preemption rules out the notion of blanket preemption. Id. at 918-
19. Nonetheless, it seems that very few courts realize this contradiction in favoring
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3. Section 360h(d)'s Savings Clause Clearly Contemplates the
Availability of State Tort Law Actions
When enacting the Medical Device Amendments, Congress included
section 360h(d), which provides that no person will escape liability
under federal or state law for merely complying with a regulatory or-
der.2 4' This provision proves to be important, as it reveals a clear
statement by Congress regarding a medical device manufacturer's po-
tential liability under state law.249 The provision compels the conclu-
sion that Congress presumed that plaintiffs could bring tort actions
against device manufacturers even after it enacted the MDA. 250 This
interpretation mirrors Congress' intent to protect consumers.25' Thus,
section 360h(d), considered in conjunction with sections 360k(a) and
(b), supports the strong presumption against preemption of all state
tort claims.25'
blanket preemption.
248. Appellant's Brief at 26, Talbott 11 (No. 94-1951). See supra note 93 and ac-
companying text for a description of § 360h(d). See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d
1335, 1342-43 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996). The Lohr court
found that the savings clause could refer to non-tort types of liability. Id. See supra part
III.B for a detailed discussion of Lohr.
249. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 23-24, Talbott H (No. 94-1951) (citing Mulligan
v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 633, 636 (S.D. Ohio 1994), for the finding that § 360h(d)
"specifically contemplates state law liability and damages").
250. In Talbott II, the plaintiffs argued that the distinction between economic and
non-economic damages in § 360h(d) (an unnecessary distinction "if personal injury
damages were preempted") compels the conclusion that personal injury actions would
survive the MDA's enactment. Appellant's Reply Brief at 23 n.18, Talbott H (No. 94-
1951).
The Talbott I plaintiffs also stressed that "§ 360h(d) represents a clear congressional
denial of a compliance defense for manufacturers." Id. at 24. They claimed that "[in
light of Congress' refusal to grant such a defense, [courts] should not construe § 360k(a)
to reverse [this] decision." Id.
25 1. See supra part II.B.2. The provision portrays the notion that while the victims
of defective medical devices are not assured awards of compensation by the FDA, the
MDA nonetheless recognizes that potential victims possess the right to a remedy under
state law if it is consistent with the federal regulations. See Adler & Mann, supra note
42, at 929 (suggesting that a "company's compliance with an FDA recall order [under §
360h(d)] will not bar tort claims against it," and reiterating the law's emphasis on pro-
tecting consumers).
252. See McCuin v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 817 F.2d 161, 168 (Ist Cir.
1987) (suggesting that "[i]n interpreting statutes and regulations, courts must try to
give them a harmonious, comprehensive meaning, giving effect, when possible, to all
provisions") (citing Weinberger v. Hynson, 412 U.S. 609, 630-31 (1973)). See also
United States v. Colon-Ortiz, 866 F.2d 6, 11 (lst Cir.) (remarking that statutes should
generally be interpreted so as to give effect to every provision), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1051 (1989).
253. Mulligan, 850 F. Supp. at 636.
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B. The MDA's Legislative History Lacks Support for a Finding of
Preemption of Common Law Tort Claims
While preemption inquiries require examination of congressional
intent,2 4 every federal statute enacted need not necessarily preempt all
related state law.255 Thus, before courts conclude that federal laws
preempt a state's ability to protect its citizens through the legal system,
they should wait for a "clear statement of congressional intent., 256 The
absence of a clear statement by Congress remains a significant consid-
eration in weighing against preemption. 7 A review of the MDA's
legislative history does not reveal any intention by Congress to pre-
empt all state tort claims.8
In enacting the MDA, Congress paid critical attention to its concern
with increasing the protection afforded consumers from dangerous
medical devices.2 59 Thus, if Congress aimed primarily at promoting
safety, Congress would not abolish the inherent safety aspects of tort
lawsuits 260 by destroying them with the same statute it enacted to ad-
254. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988).
255. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
256. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
257. Ausness, supra note 26, at 283.
258. See Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 924 & nn.130-31(listing all legislative
history sections to validate this point). The Talbott 1 decision to preempt all plain-
tiffs tort claims is misleading because it fails to recognize that the legislative history
of the MDA does not instruct the FDA or the courts to preempt these claims.
259. In the House Floor Debate on the Conference Bill, one speaker noted:
Although countless lives have been saved or improved by the use of medical
devices, the potential for harm has been heightened by the critical medical
conditions in which sophisticated devices are being used and by the compli-
cated technology involved in their manufacture and use. We know too well of
significant defects presented by inadequately tested pacemakers, heart valves,
and intrauterine devices. What is needed is balanced and precise legislation
designed to safeguard the health of the American public, authorizing swift ac-
tion where necessary, but avoiding unwarranted and expensive over-regula-
tion.
House Floor Debate on Conference Bill, 122 CONG. REC. H4382-4384 (1976) (statement
of Sen. Rogers), in AN ANALYTICAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE
AMENDMENTS OF 1976 (Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976). Adler and Mann note
that the "critical, and endlessly repeated focus of congressional attention" was to protect
consumer safety. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 922-23 n.126. See also Larsen v.
Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1281 (Haw. 1992) (contending that the legislative
history reveals Congress' concern to protect consumers under existing law rather than
restricting it); H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-12 (1976) (showing the con-
gressional committee's concerns for a device's safety and effectiveness).
260. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 211 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (citing
W.L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 5, at 23 (4th ed. 1971) and Robert A.
Prentice & Mark E. Roszkowski, "Tort Reform" and the Liability "Revolution":
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vance safety. 261 Further, the MDA's legislative history lacks any
indication to support the conclusion that "Congress intended to foster
the medical device industry 'at all costs.'
' 262
Additionally, the MDA's legislative history does "not [contain] one
word of debate or commentary address[ing] state tort law reme-
dies. 263 In the recent case of Chisom v. Roemer,264 the Supreme
Court acknowledged the propriety of making inferences from such
legislative silence.265 There, the Court established that if Congress in-
tended to remove all means of judicial recourse, it would have either
explicitly stated so in the statute, or some of its representatives would
surely have acknowledged it at some point in the legislative history.266
As some commentators note, historically, heated congressional debates
ensue whenever members of the House or Senate attempt to pass
broad federal products liability laws.267 Clearly, those favoring tort re-
form would not need to continue the debate over these continually-
proposed product liability laws if Congress had preempted state tort
law when it enacted the MDA. 268
Defending Strict Liability in Tort for Defective Products, 27 GONz. L. REV. 251. (1991-
92)), aff'd, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 14,513 (I1. Jan. 18, 1996).
26 1. Id. In view of the importance of the right individuals possess to common law
remedies for wrongful injury, one would expect Congress to provide some legislative
history indicating its intention to obliterate such significant claims. Adler & Mann,
supra note 42, at 923 n.128. Instead, the "legislation gives the American people the
kinds of protection they need and have every right to expect." Senate Floor Debate on
Conference Bill, 120 CONG. REC. S. 7286-7287 (1976) (statement of Sen. Kennedy), in
AN ANALYTICAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMENDMENTS OF 1976
(Daniel F. O'Keefe, Jr. et al. eds., 1976).
262. Appellant's Reply Brief at 17, Talbott 11, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 257 (1984)). See also Silkwood, 464
U.S. at 257 (rejecting an argument that common law remedies should be preempted be-
cause they would frustrate Congress' express desire to foster participation in the devel-
opment of nuclear energy; such a desire did not mean that nuclear power promotion was
to be accomplished "at all costs").
263. Appellant's Brief at 17, Talbott 1 (No. 94-1951). See also Haudrich, 642
N.E.2d at 211 (indicating that the MDA debates and congressional records are "barren of
any indication" that Congress' intent in passing the statute was to preempt tort law).
264. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
265. Id. at 395-96; Appellant's Brief at 18, Talbott 11 (No. 94-1951). "if ever there
were [sic] an instance in which significance should attach to congressional silence, ...
preempting tort claims is it." Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 942.
266. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 396 n.23. See also Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 940
(suggesting that it is "inconceivable that as Draconian a measure as preempting" state
tort claims is included in the MDA "without one word from concerned members of
Congress").
267. Adler & Mann, supra note 42, at 940. Further, attempts to protect products that
have complied with the FDA's regulations have been ongoing since 1977. Id. at 941
n.187.
268. Appellant's Reply Brief at 20, Talbott Ii (No. 94-1951). See also Mitchell v.
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The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment
expressed his disbelief when he learned that defendants in products li-
ability cases argue that Congress intended to preempt state laws which
compensate victims of medical device manufacturers.2 69 He assured
that he never intended the MDA to preempt such laws.270 Nor was he
aware of any member of Congress who intended such preemption.27'
One state court highlighted the fact that other congressional commit-
tees recognized and expressed this lack of intent to preempt in findings
that involved requirements imposed by states or counties, not by
courts, as evidenced by the emphasis on jurisdiction and localities.272
Further, the Commerce Committee's repeated reference to "regulation"
and the use of an affirmative statutory scheme as the only example
given in the legislative history 273 reiterates Congress' lack of intent to
preempt court decisions.
C. The FDA Does Not View Section 360k as Preempting State
Common Law Claims
The "principle of deference to agency decision-making" 274 proposes
that an agency's interpretations of its own statute must be given great
weight.275 The Supreme Court recently declared that where a statute
presents ambiguities, courts must first determine whether the subject
agency based its position on a "permissible" construction of the
statute. 6 If it finds the agency's interpretation reasonable, the court
must defer to the agency, even if it would have reached a different in-
277terpretation.
Collagen Corp., 870 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Ind. 1994) (acknowledging that proposals in-
troduced in Congress, such as one brought in 1993, would be unnecessary if the MDA
preempted state tort law claims).
269. See Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, U.S. House of Representatives, to Robert Steinberg (Aug. 10, 1993),
reprinted in Appellant's Brief at 18, Talbott 11 (No. 94-1951).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Haudrich, 642 N.E.2d at 211.
273. See id. (describing the subject California statute); see also Adler & Mann, supra
note 42, at 925 (highlighting this statute as the only example dealing with § 360k).
274. Ausness, supra note 26, at 248.
275. See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)
(determining that an agency's construction of a statute is entitled to "controlling weight
unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation").
276. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984). The agency's interpretation must not be "arbitrary, capricious, or mani-
festly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844.
277. Id. at 842-43. Lower courts follow this directive. See, e.g., LaMontagne v. E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 834 F. Supp. 576, 582 (D. Conn. 1993) (turning to the
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This same principle applies to the question of preemption under the
MDA. 278 Because the FDA's interpretations offer valuable insight into
the functioning and effect of the MDA on tort law, they must be exam-
ined.279 First, section 808.1(d) parallels expressed congressional in-
tent.280  Numerous courts have construed this section "to be an
authoritative construction of the MDA's preemptive provision by the
FDA, '28 R as it restricts the type of state laws that may be preempted.282
FDA's interpretation of § 360k for guidance), aff'd, 41 F.3d 846 (2d Cir. 1994); Larsen
v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (practicing the principle set forth
by the Supreme Court in Chevron).
278. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 714-15
(1985) (finding interpretations of a federal agency, the FDA, dispositive on the question
of preemption).
279. The Haudrich court provided valuable instruction on where to begin such an in-
terpretation of the FDA regulations: with basic definitions. See Haudrich v.
Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 211 (111. App. Ct. 1994), aff'd, 2 Prod. Liab. Rep.
(CCH) 14,513 (Il1. Jan. 18, 1996). The court first established the definitions of
"political subdivision" and "compelling local conditions." Id. at 211-12. It then deter-
mined that Congress and the FDA did not contemplate courts to be a source of require-
ments under the definition of "political subdivision." Id. at 212. Next, the court found
that courts resolve disputes which do not depend on the same factors or considerations as
in the definition of "compelling local conditions." Id. Finally, the court suggested that
because Congress did not intend for courts to be included with those entities establish-
ing requirements, court decisions did not lie within that class of entities in which deci-
sions are preempted. Id.
The Haudrich court also extensively analyzed §§ 808.5, 808.20(a), 808.20(c), and
808.1(d) of the regulations to support its conclusion that the FDA regulations show a
lack of intent to preempt state tort claims. Id. at 21 1-13.
280. Appellant's Brief at 30, Talbott II, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951).
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Ginochio v. Surgikos, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 948, 952 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(stating that § 808.1(d) reflects congressional intent under the MDA because Congress
failed to clarify § 360k(a) when it amended the MDA in 1990); Oliver v. Johnson &
Johnson, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 251, 253 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (finding the FDA's interpreta-
tion of the preemptive scope of the MDA in § 808.1(d) controlling); Larsen, 837 P.2d at
1281 (explaining that the language of § 808.1(d) mirrors that of § 360k).
The FDA defended this position by asserting that Congress did not intend to preempt
state tort claims in its explanatory statements published shortly after it adopted its MDA
regulations. See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,663 (1978), in which the FDA stated that "[tihere is
nothing in the legislative history to indicate Congress intended that the amendments
should result in less protection for the public." Id. Over time, the FDA has firmly main-
tained its position that § 360k(a) does not affect the common law of a state. See, e.g.,
Letter from Joseph Sheehan, Chief, Regulations Staff, Department of Health and Human
Services, Food & Drug Administration, to Cindy Whaley, Esq. (Feb. 2, 1988) (on file
with author) (stating that it is the FDA's position that § 360k(a) "preempts only state
and local requirements ...[and] does not preempt general product liability require-
ments"). See also 48 Fed. Reg. 24,022 (1983) (discussing the release of medical device
reports in products liability litigation against device manufacturers under a 1980 pro-
posal); 49 Fed. Reg. 36,331 (1984) (addressing the concern that the proposed medical
device rule "will result in increased product liability litigation"); 49 Fed. Reg. 36,337
(1984) (rejecting the notion that the medical device reporting requirement will lead to
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Some courts suggest that the FDA interprets the term "court deci-
sions" in section 808. 1(b) as falling among that state law which is pre-
empted.283 Indeed, section 808.1(b)'s parenthetical phrase, "court
decision," offers the only suggestion in the statute that could conceiv-
ably be read to support the preemption of state tort law.284 Consistent
with its interpretation that the MDA does not call for complete preemp-
tion, however, the FDA equates the term "requirement" with a state
statute and not a court decision in section 808.1 (d)(6)(ii). 85 The FDA
explained the regulation and remarked that "when determining whether
a state requirement is preempted, the Commissioner" considers the re-
quirement's application and interpretation, "not merely the literal lan-
guage of the applicable statute. '286 Thus, the use of the term "court
decision" in this regulation suggests that the judiciary interprets state
statutes, not state law causes of action.2 87 Section 808. l(d)(1) further
strengthens this conclusion by reflecting and reiterating the FDA's
long-standing view that this was its official position.288
Similarly, as one court correctly noted, the parenthetical language in
section 808. 1(b) runs contrary to every other FDA statement on this
point, including all of its statements which continuously refer to
"'State and local governments,"' "'State or local legislative body,"'
"'State statutes,"' and "'State or local provision,"' with no mention of
court decisions being preempted.28 9 Therefore, a court may not con-
clude that preemption was mandated.29° In addition, in a rare appear-
ance by the FDA through its submission of an amicus curiae brief in
Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc.,29i the Commissioner of the FDA once
"spurious public liability claim[s]") (all reflecting the notion that the FDA contemplated
the continuing existence of state tort actions against medical device manufacturers under
the MDA). See Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 223, at 16-17.
283. Significantly, the Talbott 1 court differed from other courts which held the same
position on preemption by failing to use § 808.1(b) in support of its position that the
MDA intended to preempt all state tort claims. In fact, Talbon 1! made no mention of
and did not criticize any FDA regulations.
284. Appellant's Reply Brief at 24, Talbott H (No. 94-1951). See also Haudrich v.
Howmedica, 642 N.E.2d 206, 212-13 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (recognizing that the only de-
parture from the consistent treatment of "requirement" as being a statutory pronounce-
ment and not common law, falls on only one occasion-in § 808.1(b)), aff'd, 2 Prod.
Liab. Rep. (CCH) 14,513 (II. Jan. 18, 1996).
285. See supra note 98 for the text of this regulation.
286. 43 Fed. Reg. 18,663 (1978) (emphasis added).
287. Trial Lawyers' Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 223, at 25.
288. For additional support of this position, see the Haudrich court's comprehensive
interpretation of 21 C.F.R. § 808.20, 642 N.E.2d at 212-13.
289. Id. at 213 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 18661, 18662-64 (May 2, 1978)).
290. Id.
29 1. As the Boston Globe reported, "[t]he brief was believed to represent the first
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again reaffirmed the FDA's position that common law claims are not
preempted by the MDA.292
D. Leaving Plaintiffs With No Remedies is Impermissible
It would be contrary to Congress' primary purpose in enacting the
MDA to submit that the statute "destroyed in one stroke" all of the
protective advantages advanced by tort actions in all fifty states.293
Destroying one of the MDA's purposes leaves injured persons with no
judicial recourse, and therefore, no adequate remedy.294 In the past,
the Supreme Court hesitated to find preemption where a federal law
provided no adequate remedy.295 Often looking to the Supreme
Court's decision in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,2 96 courts have
followed this judicial hesitancy because it leaves injured consumers
remediless and shields parties engaged in wrongful conduct from lia-
bility.297 The Silkwood Court emphasized that it would be difficult to
time the Justice Department and the FDA have taken such a position on such a suit."
Zuckoff, supra note 72, at 19.
292. See Appellant's Reply Brief at 25, Talbott I1 (No. 94-1951) (citing the Brief of
the FDA as Amicus Curiae at 14 n.5). In the brief, the FDA took the position that be-
cause no right of private action existed under the FDCA, the "absence of that right
'strengthens the argument that plaintiffs may seek relief under state law."' Failure-to-
Comply Claims Not Preempted, FDA Says in Amicus Brief, MEALEY'S APPELLATE REP.:
PRODUCT LIABILITY, Oct. 13, 1995, at 20 (citation omitted). Even though this is "one of
the most definitive statements to date" that the FDA has taken, id., the court in Lohr v.
Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1341 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806
(1996), stated that the FDA's brief, as representative of an agency's "litigating po-
sition," was entitled to no deference in contrast to FDA regulations. Id. at 1341 n.4.
293. Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206, 214 (Iil. App. Ct. 1994), aff'd, 2
Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) I 14,513 (Ill. Jan. 18, 1996).
294. One commentator noted that federal preemption of state tort claims immunizes
medical device manufacturers, and leaves injured plaintiffs no recourse. Truitt, supra
note 35, at 183.
295. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64
(1954) (finding no substantial reason to preempt state tort claims as it would leave
plaintiffs without a remedy).
296. 464 U.S. 238 (1984). The Silkwood Court realized that tension existed between
the fact that "safety regulation is the exclusive concern of the federal law" and the fact
that a state "may award damages based on its own law of liability." Id. at 256.
Nonetheless, the Court recognized Congress' intent to support both concepts and
tolerate the resulting tension, and decided it could "do no less." Id.
297. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1994). See,
e.g., Michael v. Shiley, 46 F.3d 1316, 1326 (3d Cir.) (eliminating state tort claims
means eliminating all of a consumer's legal remedies), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67
(1995); Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.) (noting the
strong presumption against preemption of state tort claims when the federal regulation
provides no remedy), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988); Wack v. Lederle Lab., 666 F.
Supp. 123, 127-28 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (holding that a state tort claim was not preempted
when it would have left plaintiff without a remedy). Numerous commentators concur
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believe that Congress would strip all means of judicial recourse from
persons injured by others' illegal conduct. 298 To the contrary, the
Silkwood decision provides sufficient evidence that Congress had no
intention of prohibiting states from providing state tort law remedies
under the MDA.29
While the MDA provides remedies for persons injured by unreason-
ably harmful devices,3° these remedies are entirely deficient and there-
fore theoretically nonexistent. The remedies include the repair of a
device to eliminate the risk of harm, the replacement of a device with
an equivalent or like device, or a refund of the device's purchase
price.3 °1 Yet, all of these fail to compensate plaintiffs for the actual
injury and harm suffered.30 2 Furthermore, under section 360k, the
with these courts: Kronenberg, supra note 37, at 572 (noting courts' hesitancy to pre-
empt tort actions due to the lack of a remedy); Westerfield, supra note 42, at 270 (same).
Even those courts which have followed King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993), and deprived plaintiffs of all remedies, have
expressed concern about the consequences of leaving plaintiffs remediless. See Talbott
//, 63 F.3d at 31 (acknowledging that some will question whether its decision to com-
pletely preempt claims is fair). Ms. King's attorney expressed fear over the King court's
decision: "It's frightening to think that tomorrow if you were hurt by a medical device,
you can't [sic] do anything about it .... " Truitt, supra note 35, at 155 n.3.
298. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251. Justice Blackmun reiterated the point made by the
majority by emphasizing that in its failure to legislate to compensate victims, Congress
intended that the matter "be left to the States." Id. at 264 n.7 (Blackmun,' J., dissent-
ing). He further noted that "[i]t is inconceivable that Congress intended to leave victims
with no remedy at all." Id. at 263 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Similarly, the Court in Cipollone also recognized that the "'obligation to pay com-
pensation"' proved to be an effective means of "'governing conduct and controlling pol-
icy."' Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 521 (plurality opinion) (quoting
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)). Yet one mem-
ber of the House commenting on the Talbott I1 case felt that the use of fines alone, with-
out changes to the regulations or provisions for additional means of redress, would not
be sufficient. See Letter from Ron Wyden, Chairman, Committee on Small Business,
U.S. House of Representatives, to David A. Kessler, M.D., FDA Commissioner (Nov.
24, 1993), reprinted in 5 FOOD & DRUG REP. 589, 589 (1994). Wyden thought that fines
would just become the "cost of doing business" for some companies. Id. He felt that
some companies may think it is cheaper to pay a fine than to suffer the expenses of
bringing a safe new product to market. Id. "Even worse, the same firm ... may become
a repeat offender, and plan on paying for its speeding ticket if caught again by the FDA."
Id.
299. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256. Instead, the Silkwood Court emphasized that
"Congress assumed that traditional principles of state tort law would apply with full
force unless they were expressly supplanted." Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
300. The FDA ascertains whether a device is unreasonably hazardous or presents a
significant risk to public health. See 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(l)(A)(i) (1994).
301. 21 U.S.C. § 360h(b)(2) (1994).
302. One must ask how the mere refund of a device's price compensates a victim suf-
fering from a debilitating disease caused by that defective device. The costs surely would
not be comparable.
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means of redress are not readily available to the FDA. The FDA must
first make several substantial determinations. 3  Thus, not only are the
remedies provided by the MDA highly unattainable, they do not ade-
quately compensate plaintiffs for fraudulent °4 or illegal conduct.30 5
Such a result lies contrary to Congress' intent under the MDA to pro-
tect and always give the "benefit of the doubt to the consumer. ' '306 The
result, instead, ought to allow plaintiffs the right to bring state tort ac-
tions, as Congress originally provided.
V. PROPOSAL
In what has been termed a "long-awaited move, 30 7 the Supreme
Court has finally acknowledged the need for it to define the preemptive
scope, or scope of potential liability, of the Medical Device Amend-
ments.30 8 As one of the entities responsible for protecting the general
welfare, the Court must now take this opportunity to articulate clearly
the meaning of the MDA.3l It should interpret the Amendments to af-
303. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
304. Cipollone must be read to give effect to its disallowance of fraud claims and its
observation that Congress did not indicate that manufacturers should be shielded from
"longstanding rules governing fraud." Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 529 (plurality opinion).
See also Evraets v. Intermedics Intraocular, Inc., 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 852, 858 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding no reason to believe the federal government intended to exonerate
medical device manufacturers from fraud-claims). Several courts have established that
plaintiffs are not entitled to any claims alleging fraud, even claims of the type specifi-
cally determined not to be preempted in Cipollone. Talbott !!, 63 F.3d at 30 (finding
preemption even where manufacturer defrauded the FDA); Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F.
Supp. 1015, 1022 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (stating that even if plaintiff's allegations that de-
fendants engaged in a "campaign of disinformation against the public" were true, the
claims were still preempted). But see Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1331 (3d
Cir.) (allowing fraud claims), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 67 (1995). While the Talbott II
court, in particular, wished to apply stare decisis with cases from its own circuit to sup-
port a finding of blanket preemption, it failed to apply the same principle to Supreme
Court cases by not allowing fraud claims. Congress could not have intended for this re-
sult to occur.
305. As one court noted, if Congress planned to "nullify an entire body of state con-
sumer protection law" and leave injured parties remediless, it would have clearly ex-
pressed this intention. Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1440
(C.D. Cal. 1994).
306. See supra text accompanying note 68.
307. Supreme Court to Hear Appeal of Lohr Preemption Case, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.,
Jan. 26, 1996, at 4.
308. While having denied Mrs. King's Petition for Certiorari, King v. Collagen
Corp., 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993), on January, 19, 1996, the Court granted the Petition for
Certiorari filed in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr and Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335
(11th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886).
309. Stephen D. Harris, Preemption of State Tort Claims Under the Medical Device
Amendments, 24 COLO. LAW. 2217, 2220 (1995) (noting that "this area of the law is in
constant flux, and there are few clearly defined rules as to which claims may be subject to
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ford plaintiffs their rightful claims, especially claims against manufac-
turers who have intentionally defrauded the FDA, falsely misrepre-
sented their products, or concealed information pertinent to public
safety. In essence, the Court should make the manufacturers pay for
their wrongful actions, not the victims.31
Only by allowing judicial recourse to an injured consumer will Con-
gress' true purpose, intent, and effect in enacting the MDA be realized.
If the Court views the MDA as preempting all of a plaintiff's state tort
claims, the medical device industry will have come full circle from the
days of the Dalkon Shield, before the enactment of the MDA. During
those days, injured and deceased victims of defective medical devices
were prevented from receiving their just compensation.' Instead, the
Court must remember the "public outcry" before 1976312 and not allow
companies,313 such as C.R. Bard, Inc., to conceal their activities be-
hind the protection offered by federal preemption. If the Court imple-
ments this view, Congress' intent under the MDA to protect human life
and health will be more fully recognized.
Additionally, the FDA must amend its regulations interpreting the
statute's express preemption provision so that the provision explicitly
disallows blanket preemption of state tort claims.314 As the Supreme
.Court has suggested, it is simpler for an agency to amend its regula-
tions to further the goals the federal law "sought to promote" than it is
preemption").
310. See Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 907 (Pa. 1974)
(stating that no "societal interest is served by permitting the manufacturer to place a de-
fective article in the stream of commerce and then to avoid responsibility for damages
caused by the defect").
3 11. Some commentators suggest that if courts had applied blanket preemption to
the Dalkon Shield cases, the manufacturer would have won the battle against illegal con-
duct, leaving hundreds of thousands of victims without recompense and justice. Adler &
Mann, supra note 42, at 945.
312. See supra note 64.
3 13. The judge presiding over the Dalkon Shield cases strongly assailed the company
who manufactured the device:
[Y]our company has in fact continued to allow women, tens of thousands of
them, to wear this device-a deadly depth charge in their wombs ready to ex-
plode at any time .... The only conceivable reasons you have not recalled
this product are that it would hurt your balance sheet and alert women who have
already been harmed that you may be liable for their injuries ....
RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY
20 (1991) (quoting Judge Miles Lord). This publication is reprinted in Adler & Mann,
supra note 42, at 945 n.201. The court in the criminal action against C.R. Bard, Inc.
also accused the company of such greed and ordered it to alert potential victims for
whose injuries Bard may be liable. See supra note 125.
314. See Sunshine, supra note 84, at 206 (suggesting that the FDA should enact
amendments to specifically allow fraud claims).
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for Congress to indicate its intentions by amending the statute.31 5
Once it has done so, the FDA must seek and use every opportunity to
make known its views opposing blanket preemption.1 6
The current situation, however, also requires Congress to clarify the
preemptive scope of the MDA in definitive language. 3 7 This illumina-
tion would prove to be essential both to manufacturers and consumers
in determining their behaviors, responsibilities, and rights.18 In fact,
public policy demands such action.
Finally, state and federal courts dealing with the question of pre-
emption of state tort claims should continue to move away from deci-
sions such as those enforced by the King and Talbott courts.320 These
decisions shield manufacturers who discredit the provisions of the
MDA and who violate the congressional purpose of protecting individ-
ual consumers. In essence, decisions such as King and Talbott take
the "human" element out of the MDA and focus solely on the
"technology" element. 321
315. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 721
(1985).
316. Additionally, the "FDA has no expertise or authority for managing systems of
redress for private injuries .... [S]uch management ... [should be] left to legislatures
and courts." Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 761 n.22
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The
Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 233, 233 (1986)).
Taken together, these two suggestions require a compromise as Truitt suggests. Truitt,
supra note 35, at 181-82. Truitt recommends that the FDA should determine (through its
regulations) the standards that a device must meet before entering commerce, while
courts and juries should determine whether manufacturers are shielded from liability in
regard to the safety of their product. Id.
317. One commentator suggested that "the first step in stemming the tide of judicial
preemption is to alert Congress to the way in which the MDA has been interpreted by
courts." Gail H. Javitt, I've Got You Under My Skin-And I Can't Get Redress: An
Analysis of Recent Case Law Addressing Preemption of Manufacturer Liability for Class
III Medical Devices, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553, 573 (1994).
3 18. See Adler, supra note 64, at 517 (explaining the need for congressional clarifi-
cation).
319. See, e.g., Jortberg, supra note 42, at 981-83 (discussing policy reasons for im-
posing liability). See also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(Cal. 1994) (Traynor, J., concurring) (suggesting that public policy requires the applica-
tion of liability when a manufacturer places a defective product on the market that will
cause human injury).
320. These courts "have run amok in their rulings on preemption." Adler & Mann,
supra note 42, at 898. Their rulings prevent "severely injured [persons] from even enter-
ing the courtroom." Id. at 942-43. Thus, total preemption denies plaintiffs the oppor-
tunity to argue that their injuries are due to defectively-designed and manufactured de-
vices, fraudulently-approved devices, devices with poor warnings, and devices which
should already have been removed from the market. Id.
321. Although technological innovation is a legitimate goal in regard to medical de-
vices, it should not be achieved "at the expense of health and safety." Jortberg, supra
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The First, Ninth, and the Eleventh Circuits are clearly at odds on the
preemption issue. To render justice to victims such as Eunice Beavers
and to guide the lower courts, the Supreme Court has taken the oppor-
tunity to proffer a final judgment. If changes and clarifications are
implemented and utilized to give effect to Congress' original goal of
protecting consumers by allowing state tort claims, manufacturers will
be encouraged to continue to improve their products.322 In addition,
the changes will enable consumers to rightfully seek redress 3 23 for
their injuries without making a significant impact on the already-over-
crowded court systems.324 To allow for any other conclusion to the
situation would be "heartless. ' 3
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal circuit courts have split three ways in interpreting the pre-
emption provision of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976. These
courts have found either total preemption, partial preemption, or no
preemption of state tort law claims. The Supreme Court will soon re-
solve this circuit split. In its decision, the Court should consider the
plain language of the statute, the clearly-expressed legislative intent,
and the FDA's interpretation of the statute. All of these factors support
the conclusion that the Medical Device Amendments do not prevent
victims of malfunctioning medical devices from obtaining a remedy
from the manufacturers of those devices under state common law.
ANNE-MARIE DEGA
note 42, at 999.
322. One court acknowledged that a state's tort law system acts as an incentive for
manufacturers to improve their products and disclose developments, while conversely,
allowing blanket preemption encourages them to withhold disclosure of problems with
their products. Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747, 760 (S.D.N.Y.
1994).
323. "Why should medical devices be protected from tort liability any more than
other 'high-tech' products such as drugs, automobiles, or computers?" Adler & Mann,
supra note 42, at 922 n.125.
324. See Appellant's Brief at 6-7, Talbott 11, 63 F.3d at 25 (No. 94-1951). The brief
cites statistics rejecting the contention that products liability cases "clog" the legal
system. Id. For example, in 1992, the 226,895 products liability cases filed in the fed-
eral courts comprised only 4.7% of the total number of cases filed. Id. (citing U.S
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 206).
Similarly, in the more than 19 million cases handled by state courts in 1992, only 4%
consisted of products liability claims. Id. (citing STATE JUSTICE INSTITUTE, STATE COURT
CASELOAD STATISTICS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 15).
325. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 267 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (suggesting that the implication of depriving injured victims of compensation
is "heartless").
